The year is 1719. The scene is London, England. King George I, recently arrived from Germany, sits on the throne of England. Unlike the French, the English have not yet created a local or national police force to protect its citizens. The entrepreneurial class filled the official void, and established themselves as "thief-takers," bounty hunters hired to capture criminals. The most notorious of the thief-takers, Jonathan Wild, exploited his status to form an organized crime gang of thieves who stole property only to be hired by the victim, who would pay for its return, to "find" the same stolen property.
England is suffering financially at this time under the weight of a growing national debt because of the War of Spanish Succession. The South Sea Company, a business organized in the early 18th century as a stock company, buys half of the national debt in exchange for its stock, pursuant to a plan to convert that debt to lower interest debt that would ease the government's financial burden, but also provide the South Sea Company with steady revenue. The South Sea Company then pursued a program to drive up the price of its stock and a speculative frenzy ensued. By 1720, the infamous South Sea Bubble, the first stock market crash, occurred, leading to bankruptcies and other financial problems across Europe.
There is a nascent, unregulated stock market operating out of coffeehouses on and around Exchange Alley, where "stock jobbers" trade in company stocks. Stock jobbers are not held in high reputation, apparently for all the reasons that, over 200 years later, the United States of America established a Security and Exchange Commission to regulate this trade.
All of this is true, and against this background, David Liss' fictional story of a competing thief-taker, Benjamin Weaver, begins in earnest. Weaver, a Jew among the predominantly Protestant community of England, has assimilated reasonably well. He has recently become a "thief-taker," retired from his earlier professional roles as highwayman and competitive boxer. He now competes with Jonathan Wild for clients, but unlike Wild he forswears the unethical practice of stealing only to later "find" the stolen booty for a fee. Weaver is the grandson of Miguel Lienzo, the protagonist of Liss' third novel, The Coffee Trader, a prequel of sorts to A Conspiracy of Paper. Liss' oeuvre, if we want to call it that is not generic historical fiction, but economic historical fiction. The marketplace is as much a part of his work as the cast of characters and the plot.
A murder has allegedly occurred, and A Conspiracy of Paper is essentially a whodonit. The precise "who" is known early on, but the "official" conclusion is that the death was merely an accident. Others, however, suspect foul play --- a "conspiracy." Suspects abound as to who is really behind the conspiracy.
This is the period of the English Enlightenment. John Locke is fifteen years in the grave. David Hume (see February 27, 2011, post) is only 8 years old. But Isaac Newton is in the golden era of his illustrious life. Bernard Mandeville was editing his Fable of the Bees (see January 30, 2010 post), and George Berkeley was active trying to undo Locke's view of a materialist world.
To solve the murder mystery, however, none of these Enlightenment philosophers contributes to a method of investigation. A French mathematician and Catholic philosopher, Blaise Pascal, provides a source of inspiration. Probability theory is invoked. And so is right brain/left brain wisdom. I refer to the mind's right brain capacity to make intuitive hunches, and the left brain capacity to meditate, analyze, and sort through information. Weaver's friend, Elias, advises him, "[Pascal's] thinking is precisely what will allow you to resolve this matter, for you must work with probability rather than facts. If you can only go by what is probable, you will sooner or later learn the truth." Weaver responds, "Are you suggesting I conduct this matter by randomly choosing paths of inquiry?" Elias responds, "Not randomly. If you know nothing with certainty, but you guess reasonably, acting upon those guesses offers the maximum chance of learning who did this with the minimal amount of failure. Not acting offers no chance of discovery. The great mathematical minds of the last century, Boyle, Wilkins, Glanvil, Gassendi --- have set forth the rules by which you are to think if you are to find your murderer. You will not act on what your eyes and ears show you, but on what your mind thinks probable."
The murder victim is Weaver's father --- the son of Miguel Lienzo, who migrated from Amsterdam to London with his brother. Weaver's father is a stock-jobber, and Weaver suspects, as information starts to become available, that his father uncovered a conspiracy to manipulate the value of South Sea Company stock.
Only later in the novel, as Weaver laments how difficult it has become to bring the investigation of his father's murder to a conclusion, and he says, "Your philosophy [referring to Elias] has brought me this far, but I cannot see how it takes me much farther," Elias responds, "If philosophy no longer yields results, perhaps it is not because you have reached your limit to understanding philosophy. I think it is far more probable that philosophy had done what philosophy can do, and you would be wise to trust your instincts as fighter and a thief-taker. . . Trust your instincts." What would Sherlock Holmes say?
In the end the crime is solved, not because of instinct, but because a crucial piece of information suddenly falls into Weaver's lap -- the revelation of a lie that reveals the identity of the murderer. The revelation is not accidental. Jonathan Wild pushed the information in front of Weaver to help him out. The conspiracy behind the murder of his father turns out to be a vastly different conspiracy than Weaver initially postulated and conceived. Probabilities and beliefs did not solve this murder. Factual information did, much in the way that scientific experimentation during the Enlightenment era was undermining long-held beliefs that were products of mental reasoning, faith, and bias.
Decisions are made based on probabilities because we have incomplete information, uncertainty. Hume essentially made the point (see February 27, 2011 post), and he could not have been the first. Some people have access to more information than others and can act on superior information to their advantage. Wild is such a person, and in Wild's version of thief-taking where the taker is also the thief, it is just an early version of what we now call insider-trading. A Conspiracy of Paper was written and published as the 20th century came to a close and the technology stock bubble burst. And stock market manipulation and insider trading have not disappeared either. Liss is an excellent storyteller, and he is very clever at detecting in the annals of economic history, just as he did too in The Coffee Trader, the parallel times of the human past that reverberate in the modern mind.
Showing posts with label belief. Show all posts
Showing posts with label belief. Show all posts
Wednesday, November 16, 2011
Sunday, July 17, 2011
Jose Saramago, The Elephant's Journey (2008)
A portion of the oeuvre of Jose Saramago revolves around themes of life and death. But even in the context of a novel like All The Names , about the custodian of national records of birth and death, the story is really about a person's life. And as we just saw in the previous post discussing The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis, the story of the last nine months of a man's life and his conversations with another man who has just died, the story is really about relationships among the living. In Saramago's Death With Interruptions, death takes a holiday and the religious institutions are confronted with the prospect of real eternal life, leading the institution to realize that if we don't start dying again "we have no future."
The Elephant's Journey, Saramago's final novel, published two years before he died in 2010, is not as philosophically deep as his earlier novels, but this story of an elephant's journey from India to Lisbon to Vienna during the 16th century --- a historical event fictionalized by Saramago, because there is no detailed record of the journey that has been left behind --- ends in the death of the elephant two years after his arrival in Vienna. For Saramago, however, the elephant's death merely affirms life and our memory of life: the Austrian Archduke Maximilian, who received the elephant as a gift from King Joao III of Portugal, writes to the king to inform him of the elephant's death and states "that the inhabitants of Vienna will never forget [the elephant], for he had saved the life of a child on the very day he arrived in [Vienna]."
For Saramago, the measure of a life's journey is how well we "master the art of living" --- a phrase to be sure for which there will be more disagreements than agreements on the appropriate metric for this measure. In an entry in The Notebook (see September 28, 2010 post), Saramago writes about the Italian journalist Robert Saviano, who received death threats for having written a book denouncing the Camorra, a criminal organization. He says, "I think of Roberto Saviano whose head they would have on a plate, and I wonder whether one day we will wake up from the nightmare that is life for some many people, persecuted for telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I feel humble, almost insignificant, faced with the dignity and courage of the writer and journalist Roberto Saviano, the man who has mastered the art of living."
Just a few nuggets from The Elephant's Journey worth quoting, and they connect to a theme about human creativity and storytelling that is reflected in previous posts, including the most recent post.
"It's hard to understand just why the archduke maximilian should have decided to make such a journey at this time of year, but that is how it's set down in history, as an incontrovertible, documented fact, supported by historians and confirmed by the novelist, who must be forgiven for taking certain liberties with names, not only because it is his right to invent, but also because he had to fill in certain gaps so that the sacred coherence of the story was not lost. It must be said that history is always selective, and discriminatory too, selecting from life only what society deems to be historical and scorning the rest, which is precisely where me might find the true explanation of facts, of things, of wretched reality itself. In truth, I say to you, it is better to be a novelist, a fiction writer, a liar." And thus is historical fiction. The Bible stories too --- the work of redactors, editors, and novelists, who must be forgiven for taking certain liberties because it was their right to invent and fill in certain gaps so that the sacred coherence of the story was not lost."
And finally, "People say a lot of things, and not all of them are true, but that is what human beings are like, they can as easily believe that the hair of an elephant, marinated in a little oil, can cure baldness, as imagine that they carry within them the one solitary light that will lead them along life's paths, even through mountain passes." Saramago, a master storyteller, knows that stories that defy human experience are not all true, like the conversation about Subhro's story about a cow that battles a pack of wolves told at that point in The Elephant's Journey, when the Portuguese are preparing to hand over their king's gift of the elephant to the Austrians. "[W]ho told you the story [about the cow and the wolves]? A Galician. And where did he hear it? He must have heard it from someone else, Or read it. As far as I know, he can't read. All right, perhaps he heard it and memorized it. Possibly, but I was simply interested in retelling it as best I could. You have an excellent memory, and the language in which you told the story was far from ordinary. Thank you, said Subhro, but now I would like to know which bits of the story remain unclear to you and failed to ring true? The first is that we are given to understand or, rather, it is explicitly stated that the struggle between the cow and the wolves lasted twelve days and twelve night, which would mean that wolves attacked the cow on the very first night and only withdrew on the twelfth, presumably having sustained some losses. We weren't there to see what happened. No, but anyone who knows anything about wolves would know that, although they live in a pack, they hunt alone. What are you getting at? asked Subhro. I'm saying that the cow wouldn't have been able to withstand a concerted attack by three or four wolves for one hour, let alone twelve days. So the whole story of the battling cow is a lie. No, the lie consists only in the exaggerations, linguistic affectations and half-truths that try to pass themselves off as whole-truths." Here, Saramago does not necessarily equate the novelist, the fiction writer, and the liar --- unless the novelist tries to pass his story off as "whole-truths." Tough words for some believers. But Saramago, as evidenced by the reaction to his The Gospel According to Jesus Christ, understood this.
The Elephant's Journey, Saramago's final novel, published two years before he died in 2010, is not as philosophically deep as his earlier novels, but this story of an elephant's journey from India to Lisbon to Vienna during the 16th century --- a historical event fictionalized by Saramago, because there is no detailed record of the journey that has been left behind --- ends in the death of the elephant two years after his arrival in Vienna. For Saramago, however, the elephant's death merely affirms life and our memory of life: the Austrian Archduke Maximilian, who received the elephant as a gift from King Joao III of Portugal, writes to the king to inform him of the elephant's death and states "that the inhabitants of Vienna will never forget [the elephant], for he had saved the life of a child on the very day he arrived in [Vienna]."
For Saramago, the measure of a life's journey is how well we "master the art of living" --- a phrase to be sure for which there will be more disagreements than agreements on the appropriate metric for this measure. In an entry in The Notebook (see September 28, 2010 post), Saramago writes about the Italian journalist Robert Saviano, who received death threats for having written a book denouncing the Camorra, a criminal organization. He says, "I think of Roberto Saviano whose head they would have on a plate, and I wonder whether one day we will wake up from the nightmare that is life for some many people, persecuted for telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I feel humble, almost insignificant, faced with the dignity and courage of the writer and journalist Roberto Saviano, the man who has mastered the art of living."
Just a few nuggets from The Elephant's Journey worth quoting, and they connect to a theme about human creativity and storytelling that is reflected in previous posts, including the most recent post.
"It's hard to understand just why the archduke maximilian should have decided to make such a journey at this time of year, but that is how it's set down in history, as an incontrovertible, documented fact, supported by historians and confirmed by the novelist, who must be forgiven for taking certain liberties with names, not only because it is his right to invent, but also because he had to fill in certain gaps so that the sacred coherence of the story was not lost. It must be said that history is always selective, and discriminatory too, selecting from life only what society deems to be historical and scorning the rest, which is precisely where me might find the true explanation of facts, of things, of wretched reality itself. In truth, I say to you, it is better to be a novelist, a fiction writer, a liar." And thus is historical fiction. The Bible stories too --- the work of redactors, editors, and novelists, who must be forgiven for taking certain liberties because it was their right to invent and fill in certain gaps so that the sacred coherence of the story was not lost."
And finally, "People say a lot of things, and not all of them are true, but that is what human beings are like, they can as easily believe that the hair of an elephant, marinated in a little oil, can cure baldness, as imagine that they carry within them the one solitary light that will lead them along life's paths, even through mountain passes." Saramago, a master storyteller, knows that stories that defy human experience are not all true, like the conversation about Subhro's story about a cow that battles a pack of wolves told at that point in The Elephant's Journey, when the Portuguese are preparing to hand over their king's gift of the elephant to the Austrians. "[W]ho told you the story [about the cow and the wolves]? A Galician. And where did he hear it? He must have heard it from someone else, Or read it. As far as I know, he can't read. All right, perhaps he heard it and memorized it. Possibly, but I was simply interested in retelling it as best I could. You have an excellent memory, and the language in which you told the story was far from ordinary. Thank you, said Subhro, but now I would like to know which bits of the story remain unclear to you and failed to ring true? The first is that we are given to understand or, rather, it is explicitly stated that the struggle between the cow and the wolves lasted twelve days and twelve night, which would mean that wolves attacked the cow on the very first night and only withdrew on the twelfth, presumably having sustained some losses. We weren't there to see what happened. No, but anyone who knows anything about wolves would know that, although they live in a pack, they hunt alone. What are you getting at? asked Subhro. I'm saying that the cow wouldn't have been able to withstand a concerted attack by three or four wolves for one hour, let alone twelve days. So the whole story of the battling cow is a lie. No, the lie consists only in the exaggerations, linguistic affectations and half-truths that try to pass themselves off as whole-truths." Here, Saramago does not necessarily equate the novelist, the fiction writer, and the liar --- unless the novelist tries to pass his story off as "whole-truths." Tough words for some believers. But Saramago, as evidenced by the reaction to his The Gospel According to Jesus Christ, understood this.
Labels:
belief,
death,
fiction,
Jose Saramago,
life,
The Elephant's Journey
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Jose Saramago, The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis (1984)
We write literary fiction that is often based on personal experience, and without hesitation we call it a work of fiction. We write literary fiction that is entirely a fantasy of the mind, and again we call this a work of fiction. We write literary fiction based on recorded history, weaving historical facts that are widely accepted and acknowledged to be actual fact with a story that has no basis in fact, and without hesitation we call this a work of fiction. Similarly, we write literary fiction based on recorded history, and we revise some of these historical facts so they no longer correspond to recorded history, and we still call this a work of fiction. Yet we also write literary fiction that weaves historical facts, revises historical facts, with stories that have no basis in fact, and the work is sometimes presented as gospel fact --- non-fiction. We sometimes call these works "sacred texts." The difference between fiction and non-fiction is blurred.
There is a book that has been on the top of the recent paperback best-seller lists for non-fiction. I have not read it, and so I am unqualified to discuss it. The book is entitled Heaven is for Real, and here is how it is briefly described on the New York Times best seller list: "A father recounts his 3-year-old son’s encounter with Jesus and the angels during an appendectomy." The "what the heck" question that must come to everyone's mind is how on earth did the Times decide to put this book in the category of non-fiction? This is fiction. We know it when we see it. Well, maybe that one sentence did not do it justice. Here is how the full-length article on the book describes it:
"Just two months shy of his fourth birthday, Colton Burpo, the son of an evangelical pastor in Imperial, Neb., was rushed into emergency surgery with a burst appendix. He woke up with an astonishing story: He had died and gone to heaven, where he met his great-grandfather; the biblical figure Samson; John the Baptist; and Jesus, who had eyes that 'were just sort of a sea-blue and they seemed to sparkle,' Colton, now 11 years old, recalled."
Now we know our initial reaction is correct. This is fiction. Well maybe not. Maybe the non-fiction part is represented by the objective facts that the boy had appendicitis; he went to the hospital and had surgery; that he had a dream about meeting Samson, John, and Jesus in heaven; and that this 3-year old boy told his father about the dream. OK. So a non-fiction story that contains a description of a fictional event. But hold it. The title is "Heaven is for Real." That suggests that the fictional part of this story is somehow real. On the totality of the evidence, I vote to move this book to the fiction column.
In The Believing Brain, (see June 12, 2011 post) Michael Shermer reports on polls showing that a substantial majority of religious people believe in the afterlife: the eternal survival of the soul, heaven, and hell. The numbers are not as high for Jews, something I will discuss further below. Belief in the afterlife is constructed on what Shermer refers to patternicity and agenticity and theory of mind: we imagine ourselves and others as intentional agents continuing indefinitely into the future. As Damasio describes (see April 8, 2011 post), our brain unconsciously monitors everything that is going on in our body and it is consciously aware of the objective "me" --- our limbs, skin, the noises we make in the context of the environment we are in that are senses make us aware of --- and when this core self is coupled with the consciousness of a subjective autobiographical self -- "I" -- that autobiographical self becomes an extension of our body schema. The Theory of Mind , and what Michael Gazzaniga refers to as the decoupling device in our brains, enables projection of our unseen essence into the future, and combined with the left hemisphere of the brain's storytelling capacity we have the capacity to assign meaning and intentionality to our unseen essence, what we call our "soul," which has the ability to survive our physical death. Shermer uses the phrase "decentering," whereby we "imagine ourselves somewhere else from the Archimedean point beyond our body . . .we envision ourselves in the afterlife as a decentered image removed from this time and space into an empyreal realm." This is the brain's same capacity that enables us to create works of fiction. (See May 22, 2011 post). Our belief in heaven, hell, the eternal soul arises from our brain's capacity to write works of fiction and tell stories about that things that do not exist.
Fernando Pessoa is an authentic person, a beloved poet of Portugal. He was particularly admired by Jose Saramago, the author of The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis. Pessoa invented "heteronyms" --- imaginary character(s) created by a writer to write in different styles --- one of which was Ricardo Reis. In Saramago's novel, Ricardo Reis arrives back in Portugal after sixteen years abroad in Brazil in mid-December 1939. Fernando Pessoa, the Portugese poet has just died on November 30, 1939 (a true historical fact). Reis is drawn to Pessoa's gravesite for a visit. Not long thereafter, Pessoa, who had been dead about a month, makes himself visible to Reis and they talk. "I have about eight months in which to wander around as I please," explains Pessoa. "Why eight months?" asks Reis, and Pessoa explains: "The usual period is nine months, the same length of time we spend in our mother's womb, I believe it's a question of symmetry, before we are born no one can see us but they think about us everyday. After we are dead they cannot see us any longer and every day they go on forgetting us a little more, and apart from exceptional cases it takes about nine months to achieve total oblivion." Perfect. So we have an "afterlife" of nine months that mirrors our "pre-life" of nine months duration. This is not illogical. But it's storytelling, no different than the storytelling in Heaven is for Real, and we do not place The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis in the category of works of non-fiction.
Alan Segal wrote a very good history of the human belief in afterlife entitled Life After Death: A History of the Afterlife in Western Religion. Segal cites the same polling data that Michael Shermer refers to about the substantial number of people who believe in an afterlife. Belief in afterlife is documented to go back as far as we have a written record of human culture --- to Egypt and Mesopotamia. Ironically, the culture that coalesced around a single god --- the founders of monotheism --- the Jews (First Temple Judaism) was devoid of a story of the afterlife in pentateuch --- the five books of Moses. The afterlife did not creep into the Jewish psyche until a couple of hundred years BCE, around the time of the Book of Daniel or the period of the Maccabees, and it later became a part of the rabbinical tradition. This probably explains why belief in the afterlife is significantly lower among Jews than among Christians and Muslims. Ironically, Spinoza was excommunicated by his Jewish community in Amsterdam in the late 17th century because, in substantial part, he professed that there was no eternal soul. Segal also singles out adherents of Confucianism for very low belief in an afterlife.
Segal's history of human belief in afterlife, and even Spinoza's experience, confirms the role of culture and social structure --- religion, government, and family --- in reinforcing beliefs such as belief in the afterlife. Shermer's list of biases do not seem sufficient to explain why belief in the afterlife is so engrained --- although one bias that Shermer only mentions in passing --- the authority bias. the tendency to believe the word of persons in positions of authority --- would go part of the way in explaining the strength of this belief. There is something more in the reinforcement of this belief than just the biases that Shermer explains are critical to confirming belief. Storytelling is part of our social nature, and our capacity for storytelling is clearly something that has a survival value for us, even when it is a work of fiction. Belief in the afterlife is part of the social reality that many have constructed for themselves,. Its origin has explanation in adaptive strategies for survival at some point in our past.
There is a book that has been on the top of the recent paperback best-seller lists for non-fiction. I have not read it, and so I am unqualified to discuss it. The book is entitled Heaven is for Real, and here is how it is briefly described on the New York Times best seller list: "A father recounts his 3-year-old son’s encounter with Jesus and the angels during an appendectomy." The "what the heck" question that must come to everyone's mind is how on earth did the Times decide to put this book in the category of non-fiction? This is fiction. We know it when we see it. Well, maybe that one sentence did not do it justice. Here is how the full-length article on the book describes it:
"Just two months shy of his fourth birthday, Colton Burpo, the son of an evangelical pastor in Imperial, Neb., was rushed into emergency surgery with a burst appendix. He woke up with an astonishing story: He had died and gone to heaven, where he met his great-grandfather; the biblical figure Samson; John the Baptist; and Jesus, who had eyes that 'were just sort of a sea-blue and they seemed to sparkle,' Colton, now 11 years old, recalled."
Now we know our initial reaction is correct. This is fiction. Well maybe not. Maybe the non-fiction part is represented by the objective facts that the boy had appendicitis; he went to the hospital and had surgery; that he had a dream about meeting Samson, John, and Jesus in heaven; and that this 3-year old boy told his father about the dream. OK. So a non-fiction story that contains a description of a fictional event. But hold it. The title is "Heaven is for Real." That suggests that the fictional part of this story is somehow real. On the totality of the evidence, I vote to move this book to the fiction column.
In The Believing Brain, (see June 12, 2011 post) Michael Shermer reports on polls showing that a substantial majority of religious people believe in the afterlife: the eternal survival of the soul, heaven, and hell. The numbers are not as high for Jews, something I will discuss further below. Belief in the afterlife is constructed on what Shermer refers to patternicity and agenticity and theory of mind: we imagine ourselves and others as intentional agents continuing indefinitely into the future. As Damasio describes (see April 8, 2011 post), our brain unconsciously monitors everything that is going on in our body and it is consciously aware of the objective "me" --- our limbs, skin, the noises we make in the context of the environment we are in that are senses make us aware of --- and when this core self is coupled with the consciousness of a subjective autobiographical self -- "I" -- that autobiographical self becomes an extension of our body schema. The Theory of Mind , and what Michael Gazzaniga refers to as the decoupling device in our brains, enables projection of our unseen essence into the future, and combined with the left hemisphere of the brain's storytelling capacity we have the capacity to assign meaning and intentionality to our unseen essence, what we call our "soul," which has the ability to survive our physical death. Shermer uses the phrase "decentering," whereby we "imagine ourselves somewhere else from the Archimedean point beyond our body . . .we envision ourselves in the afterlife as a decentered image removed from this time and space into an empyreal realm." This is the brain's same capacity that enables us to create works of fiction. (See May 22, 2011 post). Our belief in heaven, hell, the eternal soul arises from our brain's capacity to write works of fiction and tell stories about that things that do not exist.
Fernando Pessoa is an authentic person, a beloved poet of Portugal. He was particularly admired by Jose Saramago, the author of The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis. Pessoa invented "heteronyms" --- imaginary character(s) created by a writer to write in different styles --- one of which was Ricardo Reis. In Saramago's novel, Ricardo Reis arrives back in Portugal after sixteen years abroad in Brazil in mid-December 1939. Fernando Pessoa, the Portugese poet has just died on November 30, 1939 (a true historical fact). Reis is drawn to Pessoa's gravesite for a visit. Not long thereafter, Pessoa, who had been dead about a month, makes himself visible to Reis and they talk. "I have about eight months in which to wander around as I please," explains Pessoa. "Why eight months?" asks Reis, and Pessoa explains: "The usual period is nine months, the same length of time we spend in our mother's womb, I believe it's a question of symmetry, before we are born no one can see us but they think about us everyday. After we are dead they cannot see us any longer and every day they go on forgetting us a little more, and apart from exceptional cases it takes about nine months to achieve total oblivion." Perfect. So we have an "afterlife" of nine months that mirrors our "pre-life" of nine months duration. This is not illogical. But it's storytelling, no different than the storytelling in Heaven is for Real, and we do not place The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis in the category of works of non-fiction.
Alan Segal wrote a very good history of the human belief in afterlife entitled Life After Death: A History of the Afterlife in Western Religion. Segal cites the same polling data that Michael Shermer refers to about the substantial number of people who believe in an afterlife. Belief in afterlife is documented to go back as far as we have a written record of human culture --- to Egypt and Mesopotamia. Ironically, the culture that coalesced around a single god --- the founders of monotheism --- the Jews (First Temple Judaism) was devoid of a story of the afterlife in pentateuch --- the five books of Moses. The afterlife did not creep into the Jewish psyche until a couple of hundred years BCE, around the time of the Book of Daniel or the period of the Maccabees, and it later became a part of the rabbinical tradition. This probably explains why belief in the afterlife is significantly lower among Jews than among Christians and Muslims. Ironically, Spinoza was excommunicated by his Jewish community in Amsterdam in the late 17th century because, in substantial part, he professed that there was no eternal soul. Segal also singles out adherents of Confucianism for very low belief in an afterlife.
Segal's history of human belief in afterlife, and even Spinoza's experience, confirms the role of culture and social structure --- religion, government, and family --- in reinforcing beliefs such as belief in the afterlife. Shermer's list of biases do not seem sufficient to explain why belief in the afterlife is so engrained --- although one bias that Shermer only mentions in passing --- the authority bias. the tendency to believe the word of persons in positions of authority --- would go part of the way in explaining the strength of this belief. There is something more in the reinforcement of this belief than just the biases that Shermer explains are critical to confirming belief. Storytelling is part of our social nature, and our capacity for storytelling is clearly something that has a survival value for us, even when it is a work of fiction. Belief in the afterlife is part of the social reality that many have constructed for themselves,. Its origin has explanation in adaptive strategies for survival at some point in our past.
Labels:
afterlife,
belief,
decentering,
decoupling,
Fernando Pessoa,
heteronyms,
Jose Saramago,
Ricardo Reis
Sunday, June 12, 2011
Michael Shermer, The Believing Brain (2011)
This is a better, more thorough book on the subject of how we come to believe things that are not real than Supersense (see June 5, 2011 post). I say that for multiple reasons. Not just because Michael Shermer avoids a gimmicky term like "supersense," but primarily because the structure of the author's presentation and the evidence marshaled in support of his thesis is more persuasive than Hood's more anecdotal presentation. While there is much in common with the subject-matter of Supersense, in The Believing Brain Michael Gazzaniga's "left hemisphere" interpreter is presented as a candidate for the brain's storytelling capability, which reconstructs events and weaves those events into a meaningful story --- including stories that are simply works of fiction. As I said in the previous post, this storytelling capability is critical to our narratives of belief. Finally, Shermer treats his subject with seemingly more objectivity than Hood. For Shermer, the study of how we believe something is not limited to the strange or unreal --- ghosts, angels, gods, aliens and phantom conspiracies --- but also politics, economics, and even hard science.
According to Shermer (and Hood, see previous post), as sensory data flows into the brain, there is a "tendency" for the brain to begin looking for meaningful patterns in both meaningful and meaningless data. He calls this process patternicity. A second tendency of the brain is to "infuse patterns with meaning, intention, and agency." Shermer labels this tendency agenticity. Because of these tendencies, we form beliefs first and only later do we try to inform our beliefs with facts. The overall process Shermer calls belief-dependent realism (well, maybe there is one gimmicky term). This model not only purports to explain not only how we form entirely mistaken, fantasy beliefs, but also beliefs that are later embraced under the gospel of science (e.g. hypothesis later substantiated by empirical and repeatable testing).
Harkening back to David Hume (see February 27, 2011 post), Shermer asserts that patternicity is premised on "association learning," which is "fundamental to all animal behavior from C. elegans (roundworm) to homo sapiens." Because our survival may depend on split-second decisions in which there is no time to research and discover underlying facts about every threat or opportunity that faces us, evolution set the brain's default mode in the position of assuming that all patterns are real, says Shermer. A cost associated with this behavior is that the brain may lump causal associations (e.g. wind causes plants to rustle) with non-causal associations (e.g. there is an unseen agent in the plants). In this circumstance, superstition --- incorrect causal associations --- is born. "In this sense, patternicities such as superstition and magical thinking are not so much errors in cognition as they are the natural processes of a learning brain." Religion, conspiracy theories and political beliefs fit this model as well.
The difficulty faced by humans applying later learned facts to earlier-formed beliefs is that beliefs are often difficult to shake despite the fact that our factual knowledge is entirely inconsistent with the belief. The difficulty Galileo faced in convincing others that the earth revolved around the sun in violation of the long-held belief in Aristotle's geocentric view and the words of the Bible that the sun revolved around the earth is an example. What Shermer does, however, to document this difficulty is to catalog a series of biases that reinforce beliefs, which he labels cognitive heuristics that confirm the beliefs are correct. A heuristic is a brain's capacity to solve problems through intuition, trial and error, rules of thumb, or other informal means, when there is no formal means for solving the problem. These biases are part of our documented behavior, including the tendency to seek and find confirmatory evidence in support of an existing belief and to ignore or reinterpret disconfirming evidence (confirmatory bias), the tendency to reconstruct the past to fit the present (hindsight bias), the tendency to rationalize decisions after the fact to confirm that our action were the best we could have done under the circumstances (self-justification bias), the tendency to attribute different causes for our own beliefs and action than that of others (attribution bias), the tendency to believe in something because we have already invested so much in that belief (sunk-cost bias), the tendency to opt for whatever we are used to or familiar with (status quo bias), the tendency to value what we own more than what we do not own (endowment effect), the tendency to draw different conclusions based on how data is presented (framing effect), the tendency to rely too heavily on a past reference or on one piece of information (anchoring bias), tendency to miss something obvious while attending to something special and specific (inattentional blindness bias), and the tendency to recognize the power of cognitive biases in others, but to blind to their influence on ourselves (bias blind spot) and others.
Regrettably, Shermer does not provide a biological explanation for these biases (or "tendencies," as he seems inclined to refer to them). And "bias" may be too charged a term. Bias is a term that arguably reflects a cultural or community predisposition of some sort (whether the community consists of a family, a village, a region, nation or species), which is really within the province of nurture rather than nature. These "tendencies," however, can also be predispositions grounded in our biology, particularly our neurobiological system. I strongly suspect that if we dissected human brains and a network of connected neurons from a representative sample of humans, we would find a very high level of near identity among brains. There will be some differences due to DNA, and there will be some pathological differences as well, perhaps caused during embryonic development. But I believe that by and large we will find that human brains, neuron by neuron, are organized and folded and layered in substantially identical ways. This is the product of evolution. Some of these neuronal networks are unconsciously and automatically operational as part of what Damasio calls the protoself -- the body monitoring itself, (see April 8, 2011 post) and are functioning and repeating the transmission of electro-chemical signals to and from the brain even before we are born. Other neural networks are only activated in response to sensory experience with the external physical world as part of what Damasio calls the "core self," which process begins immediately with our birth. Finally, when the neural networks within the cerebral cortex are activated to trigger autobiographical memory and our storytelling capability, we find our autobiographical self. While much of the neuronal activity in the cerebral cortex is connected to the automated, unconscious neuronal networks tied to monitoring our own body and our external sensory experiences that are part of our core self experience, there is much that is influenced more by nurture than nature --- culture and learning at the social level. At the level of the protoself and the core self, except to the extent that a particular individual may have a variant pathological condition, there is a high level of commonality in the activation of neuronal networks repeatedly sending and receiving electro-chemical impulses. This is reflected in the high level of commonality of similar emotional and feeling experiences humans share in response to the same stimuli --- whether the stimuli is within the body or outside of it. There will be more differences among us at the level of the core self, because we will not always share sensory experiences with the same level of frequency as all other humans. I am now in speaking in terms of the brain's capacity for memory and learning, which, as Eric Kandel demonstrated, is influenced by synaptic connections strengthened through repeated experience and learning. In contrast, at the level of the neural networks in the cerebral cortex, there is likely to be greater disparity among us in the precise neural networks activated, because we are going to have significantly different cultural and social learning experiences. It is here where biases may be formed. But at the level of the protoself and core self, important biological predispositions or tendencies have significant influence on instincts and intuition that are part of the belief-forming process. And the tendencies that Shermer identifies may be the outcome of both of biologically hardwired predispositions and culturally learned biases.
The Believing Brain has a discussion entitled "Synaptic States and Believing Neurons" in which Shermer recognizes that neurons communicate information in three ways: (1) firing frequency, (2)firing location, and (3) firing number. This discussion also includes a recognition that certain types of chemicals in the neuronal network act to reinforce learning and belief. This discussion, in my view, supports what I just said. Shermer, on the other hand, does not incorporate this discussion into his discourse on biases, and this is a shortcoming of his discussion on biases.
Our senses evolved, Shermer observes, for "perceiving objects of middling size." I wrote in an earlier post (see August 31, 2009 post) that in my worldview, there are three very big subjects for human inquiry: 1) the realm of the very large --- the universe (and whether there is more than one, making the word universe a possible oxymoron), its origin and history; 2) the realm of the very small -- the smallest molecular (sub)units, and their behavior; and 3) the human mind --- how it works, consciousness, intentionality. "We are not equipped to perceive atoms and germs, on the one end of the scale, or galaxies and expanding universes, on the other end," writes Shermer. I disagree, but I understand Shermer's point. There are several cognitive biases, listed above (e.g., the status quo bias, the inattentional blindness bias), that discourage the general population from looking beyond objects of middling size to the realms of the very large and the very small. But frankly, most of us simply lack the education, training, and time to focus on the realms of the very large and the very small. We do not understand them. Shermer seems to have concluded that only "scientists," those trained in the scientific approach to knowing and understanding the world, are capable of neutralizing these various biases. But the substantial variation among the human population in education, training, and the amount of time we have to focus on the large and small confirms that our biases are significantly tied to culture and nurture. Are we all born with the capacity to become an Einstein or a Steven Weinberg? I am not saying that. But I don't believe Einstein became Einstein entirely on his own.
Finally, I want to return to the concept of agenticity -- the tendency to impart patterns with intention and agency, even patterns we perceive in inanimate objects, that lead us to believe that unseen agents control the world. Now we enter the world of spirits, gods, souls, devils, angels, aliens, and yes, intelligent designers. This is the domain of teleology, which I have mentioned in previous posts. (See March 24, 2010 and May 12, 2010 posts), as well as that part of philosophy that discusses intentionality --- how our brain relates to objects external to ourselves. Shermer's discussion of essentialism flows from the writings of Paul Bloom in Descartes' Baby, which concept is elaborated upon by Hood as well. Essentialism refers to the brain's ability to abstract about a physical object and to ascribe to that object an unobservable essence --- beliefs, desires, intentions and goals --- and treat these invisible essences as real. In the case of animate objects like other humans or animals, notes Michael Gazzaniga in Human, we believe they must have beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. just like our own. Anthropomorphism and teleological thinking are born.
Two questions emerge from the development of this discussion: what evolutionary value would essentialism provide to humans? And what is the biological process in the brain that explains it? Gazzaniga explains that our ability to reason about unobservable entities or unobservable essences allows humans to predict and explain events --- to predict the behavior of others. In other words, we can predict the behavior of another animal by inferring its psychological state (sometimes referred to as a theory of mind (TOM)), which would have enormous significance for survival. It also appears to relate to our storytelling capability about things that do not exist. Gazzaniga explains it this way in Human:
"Sometimes our predilection for explaining the cause of things or behaviors with teleological thinking runs amuck. One of the reasons is that the agency-detection device [in our brain] is rather zealous. Barrett calls it hyperactive. It likes to ...find animate suspects even when there are none. When you hear a sound in the middle of the night, the question that first comes to mind is Who is that? rather than What is that? When you see a wispy something moving in the dark, Who is that comes to mind because the detective device is not modern and up-to-date. The detective device was forged many thousands of years ago before there were inanimate objects that could move or make noise on their own. To first consider a potential danger as animate is adaptive. It worked most of the time. Those who did it survived and passed their genes to us. *** The hyperactive detective device, combined with our need to explain and teleological thinking, is the basis of creationism. To explain why we exist, the hyperactive detection device says there must be a Who involved. Teleological reasoning says there must be an intentional design. The cause must be the desires and intentions and behavior of the Who. The we were designed by a Who. *** All of this is reminiscent of what the left-brain interpreter would do, which it has been demonstrated to do in other settings."
The research into so-called mirror neurons (see September 18, 2009 post) puts us on the road to explaining how the brain helps us form beliefs about other people's intentions, and Shermer incorporates this research into his discussion of agenticity. So does Paul Ekman's research into facial descriptions, as described in Dacher Keltner's book Born to Be Good (see July 16, 2010 post).
I disagree with Shermer and others that we are hardwired to believe in God. Hardwired means that it is in our DNA, and I have rejected the idea that there is a "god gene" in prior posts (see November 30, 2009 post). We are hardwired to be disposed to believe first that if we do not immediately perceive a causal explanation for some event, that some unseen agent with intentions and desires and beliefs very similar to our own is the causal explanaton for this event. That unseen agent may be another person we do not see, another animal we do not see, a ghost we do not see, or the devil we do not see. We are hardwired to search for patterns in what we perceive, and we are hardwired with a storytelling capacity to explain what we perceive, and sometimes that story is based on things we can actually see and touch, and sometimes that story is made up out of whole cloth. But even if that story is made up out of whole cloth, it is a story about an agent that thinks, desires and behaves just like ourselves. God was made by humans in our image, not the other way around. In this explanation, we also begin to understand our ability for creativity --- engineering, songwriting, and writing works of fiction.
According to Shermer (and Hood, see previous post), as sensory data flows into the brain, there is a "tendency" for the brain to begin looking for meaningful patterns in both meaningful and meaningless data. He calls this process patternicity. A second tendency of the brain is to "infuse patterns with meaning, intention, and agency." Shermer labels this tendency agenticity. Because of these tendencies, we form beliefs first and only later do we try to inform our beliefs with facts. The overall process Shermer calls belief-dependent realism (well, maybe there is one gimmicky term). This model not only purports to explain not only how we form entirely mistaken, fantasy beliefs, but also beliefs that are later embraced under the gospel of science (e.g. hypothesis later substantiated by empirical and repeatable testing).
Harkening back to David Hume (see February 27, 2011 post), Shermer asserts that patternicity is premised on "association learning," which is "fundamental to all animal behavior from C. elegans (roundworm) to homo sapiens." Because our survival may depend on split-second decisions in which there is no time to research and discover underlying facts about every threat or opportunity that faces us, evolution set the brain's default mode in the position of assuming that all patterns are real, says Shermer. A cost associated with this behavior is that the brain may lump causal associations (e.g. wind causes plants to rustle) with non-causal associations (e.g. there is an unseen agent in the plants). In this circumstance, superstition --- incorrect causal associations --- is born. "In this sense, patternicities such as superstition and magical thinking are not so much errors in cognition as they are the natural processes of a learning brain." Religion, conspiracy theories and political beliefs fit this model as well.
The difficulty faced by humans applying later learned facts to earlier-formed beliefs is that beliefs are often difficult to shake despite the fact that our factual knowledge is entirely inconsistent with the belief. The difficulty Galileo faced in convincing others that the earth revolved around the sun in violation of the long-held belief in Aristotle's geocentric view and the words of the Bible that the sun revolved around the earth is an example. What Shermer does, however, to document this difficulty is to catalog a series of biases that reinforce beliefs, which he labels cognitive heuristics that confirm the beliefs are correct. A heuristic is a brain's capacity to solve problems through intuition, trial and error, rules of thumb, or other informal means, when there is no formal means for solving the problem. These biases are part of our documented behavior, including the tendency to seek and find confirmatory evidence in support of an existing belief and to ignore or reinterpret disconfirming evidence (confirmatory bias), the tendency to reconstruct the past to fit the present (hindsight bias), the tendency to rationalize decisions after the fact to confirm that our action were the best we could have done under the circumstances (self-justification bias), the tendency to attribute different causes for our own beliefs and action than that of others (attribution bias), the tendency to believe in something because we have already invested so much in that belief (sunk-cost bias), the tendency to opt for whatever we are used to or familiar with (status quo bias), the tendency to value what we own more than what we do not own (endowment effect), the tendency to draw different conclusions based on how data is presented (framing effect), the tendency to rely too heavily on a past reference or on one piece of information (anchoring bias), tendency to miss something obvious while attending to something special and specific (inattentional blindness bias), and the tendency to recognize the power of cognitive biases in others, but to blind to their influence on ourselves (bias blind spot) and others.
Regrettably, Shermer does not provide a biological explanation for these biases (or "tendencies," as he seems inclined to refer to them). And "bias" may be too charged a term. Bias is a term that arguably reflects a cultural or community predisposition of some sort (whether the community consists of a family, a village, a region, nation or species), which is really within the province of nurture rather than nature. These "tendencies," however, can also be predispositions grounded in our biology, particularly our neurobiological system. I strongly suspect that if we dissected human brains and a network of connected neurons from a representative sample of humans, we would find a very high level of near identity among brains. There will be some differences due to DNA, and there will be some pathological differences as well, perhaps caused during embryonic development. But I believe that by and large we will find that human brains, neuron by neuron, are organized and folded and layered in substantially identical ways. This is the product of evolution. Some of these neuronal networks are unconsciously and automatically operational as part of what Damasio calls the protoself -- the body monitoring itself, (see April 8, 2011 post) and are functioning and repeating the transmission of electro-chemical signals to and from the brain even before we are born. Other neural networks are only activated in response to sensory experience with the external physical world as part of what Damasio calls the "core self," which process begins immediately with our birth. Finally, when the neural networks within the cerebral cortex are activated to trigger autobiographical memory and our storytelling capability, we find our autobiographical self. While much of the neuronal activity in the cerebral cortex is connected to the automated, unconscious neuronal networks tied to monitoring our own body and our external sensory experiences that are part of our core self experience, there is much that is influenced more by nurture than nature --- culture and learning at the social level. At the level of the protoself and the core self, except to the extent that a particular individual may have a variant pathological condition, there is a high level of commonality in the activation of neuronal networks repeatedly sending and receiving electro-chemical impulses. This is reflected in the high level of commonality of similar emotional and feeling experiences humans share in response to the same stimuli --- whether the stimuli is within the body or outside of it. There will be more differences among us at the level of the core self, because we will not always share sensory experiences with the same level of frequency as all other humans. I am now in speaking in terms of the brain's capacity for memory and learning, which, as Eric Kandel demonstrated, is influenced by synaptic connections strengthened through repeated experience and learning. In contrast, at the level of the neural networks in the cerebral cortex, there is likely to be greater disparity among us in the precise neural networks activated, because we are going to have significantly different cultural and social learning experiences. It is here where biases may be formed. But at the level of the protoself and core self, important biological predispositions or tendencies have significant influence on instincts and intuition that are part of the belief-forming process. And the tendencies that Shermer identifies may be the outcome of both of biologically hardwired predispositions and culturally learned biases.
The Believing Brain has a discussion entitled "Synaptic States and Believing Neurons" in which Shermer recognizes that neurons communicate information in three ways: (1) firing frequency, (2)firing location, and (3) firing number. This discussion also includes a recognition that certain types of chemicals in the neuronal network act to reinforce learning and belief. This discussion, in my view, supports what I just said. Shermer, on the other hand, does not incorporate this discussion into his discourse on biases, and this is a shortcoming of his discussion on biases.
Our senses evolved, Shermer observes, for "perceiving objects of middling size." I wrote in an earlier post (see August 31, 2009 post) that in my worldview, there are three very big subjects for human inquiry: 1) the realm of the very large --- the universe (and whether there is more than one, making the word universe a possible oxymoron), its origin and history; 2) the realm of the very small -- the smallest molecular (sub)units, and their behavior; and 3) the human mind --- how it works, consciousness, intentionality. "We are not equipped to perceive atoms and germs, on the one end of the scale, or galaxies and expanding universes, on the other end," writes Shermer. I disagree, but I understand Shermer's point. There are several cognitive biases, listed above (e.g., the status quo bias, the inattentional blindness bias), that discourage the general population from looking beyond objects of middling size to the realms of the very large and the very small. But frankly, most of us simply lack the education, training, and time to focus on the realms of the very large and the very small. We do not understand them. Shermer seems to have concluded that only "scientists," those trained in the scientific approach to knowing and understanding the world, are capable of neutralizing these various biases. But the substantial variation among the human population in education, training, and the amount of time we have to focus on the large and small confirms that our biases are significantly tied to culture and nurture. Are we all born with the capacity to become an Einstein or a Steven Weinberg? I am not saying that. But I don't believe Einstein became Einstein entirely on his own.
Finally, I want to return to the concept of agenticity -- the tendency to impart patterns with intention and agency, even patterns we perceive in inanimate objects, that lead us to believe that unseen agents control the world. Now we enter the world of spirits, gods, souls, devils, angels, aliens, and yes, intelligent designers. This is the domain of teleology, which I have mentioned in previous posts. (See March 24, 2010 and May 12, 2010 posts), as well as that part of philosophy that discusses intentionality --- how our brain relates to objects external to ourselves. Shermer's discussion of essentialism flows from the writings of Paul Bloom in Descartes' Baby, which concept is elaborated upon by Hood as well. Essentialism refers to the brain's ability to abstract about a physical object and to ascribe to that object an unobservable essence --- beliefs, desires, intentions and goals --- and treat these invisible essences as real. In the case of animate objects like other humans or animals, notes Michael Gazzaniga in Human, we believe they must have beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. just like our own. Anthropomorphism and teleological thinking are born.
Two questions emerge from the development of this discussion: what evolutionary value would essentialism provide to humans? And what is the biological process in the brain that explains it? Gazzaniga explains that our ability to reason about unobservable entities or unobservable essences allows humans to predict and explain events --- to predict the behavior of others. In other words, we can predict the behavior of another animal by inferring its psychological state (sometimes referred to as a theory of mind (TOM)), which would have enormous significance for survival. It also appears to relate to our storytelling capability about things that do not exist. Gazzaniga explains it this way in Human:
"Sometimes our predilection for explaining the cause of things or behaviors with teleological thinking runs amuck. One of the reasons is that the agency-detection device [in our brain] is rather zealous. Barrett calls it hyperactive. It likes to ...find animate suspects even when there are none. When you hear a sound in the middle of the night, the question that first comes to mind is Who is that? rather than What is that? When you see a wispy something moving in the dark, Who is that comes to mind because the detective device is not modern and up-to-date. The detective device was forged many thousands of years ago before there were inanimate objects that could move or make noise on their own. To first consider a potential danger as animate is adaptive. It worked most of the time. Those who did it survived and passed their genes to us. *** The hyperactive detective device, combined with our need to explain and teleological thinking, is the basis of creationism. To explain why we exist, the hyperactive detection device says there must be a Who involved. Teleological reasoning says there must be an intentional design. The cause must be the desires and intentions and behavior of the Who. The we were designed by a Who. *** All of this is reminiscent of what the left-brain interpreter would do, which it has been demonstrated to do in other settings."
The research into so-called mirror neurons (see September 18, 2009 post) puts us on the road to explaining how the brain helps us form beliefs about other people's intentions, and Shermer incorporates this research into his discussion of agenticity. So does Paul Ekman's research into facial descriptions, as described in Dacher Keltner's book Born to Be Good (see July 16, 2010 post).
I disagree with Shermer and others that we are hardwired to believe in God. Hardwired means that it is in our DNA, and I have rejected the idea that there is a "god gene" in prior posts (see November 30, 2009 post). We are hardwired to be disposed to believe first that if we do not immediately perceive a causal explanation for some event, that some unseen agent with intentions and desires and beliefs very similar to our own is the causal explanaton for this event. That unseen agent may be another person we do not see, another animal we do not see, a ghost we do not see, or the devil we do not see. We are hardwired to search for patterns in what we perceive, and we are hardwired with a storytelling capacity to explain what we perceive, and sometimes that story is based on things we can actually see and touch, and sometimes that story is made up out of whole cloth. But even if that story is made up out of whole cloth, it is a story about an agent that thinks, desires and behaves just like ourselves. God was made by humans in our image, not the other way around. In this explanation, we also begin to understand our ability for creativity --- engineering, songwriting, and writing works of fiction.
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