In All The Names, Jose Saramago tells the story of a civil servant in an unnamed city of an unnamed country charged with maintaining the birth, marriage, and death records of a nation's citizens. The government agency, the Central Registry of Births, Marriages and Deaths, operates a data warehouse combining records of both the living and the dead. Of course, there is a story, a life history, for every one of these citizens and former citizens, but the data warehouse does not record those stories. In a revolutionary moment, Saramago's protagonist, an equally anonymous "Senor Jose," rebels against his assigned duty and follows his curiosity to uncover the story of one citizen whose data record on an index card prompted his curious interest in a life beyond data.
Sr. Jose had a secret hobby that propelled him to look deeper into a person than the data in the data warehouse. He collected news items about famous citizens of his country, and he would supplement his curiosity about the famous by climbing the walls of the Central Registry to collect their birth data, including information about the names of parents, godparents, birthplaces, addresses, and the like. And one night, in the Central Registry, while collecting the index cards of five famous persons, he inadvertently pulls out a card of a sixth person, an unknown woman, not famous, and he becomes obsessed with learning her story. He can't turn to the newspapers. She's not famous, after all. He puts her index card back in the file along with the five cards of the famous, but not before copying the data on the card. Sr. Jose "makes a decision," writes Saramago: he decided to look for the unknown woman. Saramago's discussion of this "decision" assembles in one paragraph a succinct discussion of free will comparatively similar to the way free will (or the lack thereof) is discussed in two recent postings on the subject (see July 15, 2013 post and May 19, 2013 post):
"Senhor Jose's decision appeared two days later. Generally speaking, we don't talk about a decision appearing to us, people jealously guard both their identity, however vague it might be, and their authority, what little they may have, and prefer to give the impression that they reflected deeply before taking the final step, that they pondered the pros and cons, that after intense mental effort, they finally made a decision. It has to be said that things never happen like that. Obviously it would not enter anyone's head to eat without feeling hungry, and hunger does not depend on our will, it comes into being of its own accord, the result of objective bodily needs, it is a physical and chemical problem whose solution, in a more less satisfactory way, will be found in the contents of a plate. Even such a simple act as going down into the street to buy a newspaper presupposes not only a desire to receive news, which, since it is a desire, is necessarily an appetite, the effect of specific physico-chemical activities in the body, albeit of a different nature, that routine act presupposes, for example, the unconscious certainty, belief or hope that the delivery van was not late or that the newspaper stand is not closed due to illness or to the voluntary absence of the proprietor. Moreover, if we persist in stating that we are the ones who make our decisions, then we would have to begin to explain, to discern, to distinguish, who it is in us who made the decision and who subsequently carried it out, impossible operations by anyone's standards. Strictly speaking, we do not make decisions, decisions make us. The proof can be found in the fact that, though life leads us to carry out the most diverse actions one after the other, we do not preclude each one with a period of reflection, evaluation and calculation, and only then declare ourselves able to decide if we will go out to lunch or buy a newspaper or look for the unknown woman." Sr. Jose walks out his door and goes to see the street where the woman purportedly lived. Sr. Jose's search to find the woman named on the sixth index card becomes an obsession to learn her story, driven by what Jaak Panksepp calls our Seeking system urges (see May 19, 2013 post).
Consider the life of an exceptional journalist, an investigative journalist who wants to tell a story, not just report data. Roberto Saviano made a decision to investigate and expose the Camorra, one of the Mafia clans in his native Naples area of Italy. Saviano probably did "reflect deeply before taking the final step," to borrow a phrase from Saramago, After all, inquiry and publicity of a Mafia sect knowingly undertakes a risk to self-preservation. He knows that the people he writes about in his book Gamorrah are killers and will not hesitate to kill him if it suits them. He knows this; he must have reflected deeply about this. This is, in the words of Richard Ryan and Edward Deci, "self-determination. (See July 15, 2013 post). Saviano assented to his course of action in exposing the Camorra, although he may very well have been driven by his Seeking system and perhaps modulated by his Fear system. (See May 19, 2013 post). Jose Saramago described Roberto Saviano as someone who "mastered the art of living." (See July 17, 2011 post). He is referring to Saviano's "courage," which refers to a mental persistence to persevere in the face of fear. Courage has to be found in the neocortex of the brain, not the subcortical emotional systems that Panksepp finds controlling. But yes, Senhor Jose made a decision that probably did not involve much reflection to search for the story of a woman who is more than a piece of data; Roberto Saviano made a decision to confront fear and seek truth that undoubtedly involved substantial reflection. Their intent is different: Senhor Jose is out to satisfy his own curiosity and perhaps derive some private reflection on the meaning of his life; Roberto Saviano is not interested in merely satisfying some private need, but to engage in social communication with a broader public, perhaps to arouse the public's reflection to some collective action.
"A writer can never be a good person," writes Saviano. "Often he comes to writing precisely because he realizes he cannot be a good person. He ends up writing with a sense of guilt for not being able to change things, in the hope that his indirect actions will multiply in his readers' consciousness, that they might act in his stead or alongside him, creating the ultimate dream of a community of people who understand, feel and walk together. People who live."
Beauty and The Inferno represents Roberto Saviano's further reflection on his infernal life in the wake of the publication of Gamorrah, in which he lives a life guarded by police charged with protecting his life from the threats of the Camorra. The parallels with the life of Salman Rushdie following the Iranian fatwa issued after publication of The Satanic Verses immediately come to mind, and the parallel is not lost on Saviano who writes an essay about his invitation to join Rushdie for a panel discussion at the Swedish Academy. But Beauty and The Inferno also reads a bit like Profiles in Courage. And among all the names that Saviano recognizes for leading a courageous life not dissimilar from his, some of whom suffered a fate we call premature death, include: Joe Pistone who squealed on the American mafia; Giancarlo Siani who also wrote about the Camorra; Uwe Johnson; Gustav Herling; Varlam Shalamov; Anna Politkovskaya. Names that may have remained anonymous pieces of data, but Saviano has captured their stories.
Showing posts with label free will. Show all posts
Showing posts with label free will. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 27, 2013
Monday, July 15, 2013
Michael Gazzaniga, Who's In Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain (2011)
What do we want to be free from? That is the question that drives Michael Gazzaniga's inquiry about free will and the science of the brain. "We don't want to be free from our experience of life, we need that for decisions. We don't want to be free from our temperament because that also guides our decisions. We actually don't want to be free from causation, we use that for prediction. A receiver trying to catch a football does not want to be free from all the automatic adjustments that his body is making to maintain his speed and trajectory as he dodges tackles. We don't want to be free from our successfully evolved decision-making device. What do we want to be free from?"
I awaken at 5:30 in the morning. Gradually my mind becomes cognitive (conscious) again. My body is telling me to stay put. Don't get up. Rest some more. I lie still for many more minutes, and inevitably my mind starts to race about what I need to do (or don't need to do) in the coming day. I need to get out of bed and start doing things. But when? I can probably afford to lie in bed until 7am and still do what I need to do over the course of the remaining day. I lie still for awhile longer. It is now forty-five minutes later. My mind wrestles with whether I should continue to try and rest or get out of bed and start being active. I cannot lie still anymore. I tell myself I will get out of bed and read a chapter of Michael Gazzaniga's book, Who's In Charge? and I do. I had a decision to make and I made it: I got out of bed at 6:15am instead of perhaps 7am. Is that what free-will is all about? What was I free from? No one else was dictating that I stay in bed. There was no social rule telling me I had to stay in bed until 7am. My body was not chained to the bed. But was this decision entirely unchained from all causes? Jaak Panskepp has compellingly explained that our Seeking urges begin with our automatic impulses deep in the subcortical areas of our brain, (see previous post), so perhaps my urge to read and learn and cease lying down was something less than volitional?
Much of what we humans and other animals do in our lives is automatic, unconscious, instinctive. As Panksepp points out, even learning, memory, and habit formation is unconscious. What is learned and habitual is not the stuff of choices and decision trees, and yet choice is what free will is purportedly about. And choice, the hallmark of "who's in charge," is typically assigned to the neocortex of the brain that resides on top of the limbic system and the forebrain. Yet if we concur with Panksepp that it is the brain's subcortical emotional system that energizes the neocortex, not the other way around, the role of the neocortex appears to be only regulatory of the urges that come from below the cortex: controlling and inhibiting impulses, instinct, and habit, not initiating behavior in the first instance.
For Gazzaniga, neuroscience (the study of the brain) does not offer much support for the common understanding of free will. The evidence from neuroscience is inconsistent with free will. Gazzaniga's first point is that there is no single executive decision center in the brain. The brain is composed of distinct modules, and while we may have a unified sense of self and making decisions, neuroscience does not support our sense that we are making decisions entirely liberated from either the environment around us or within us. Our sense of psychological unity, says Gazzaniga, emerges out of specialized system in the left side of our neocortex, which he call The Interpreter. (See June 12, 2011 post and June 5, 2011 post). This is the area of the brain in which the human tendency to want to explain things is found as well as our capacity for imagination. (See May 22, 2011 post). But as Gazzaniga explains, The Interpreter is slow. It comes to life after the event it seeks to explain has occurred. So what does it mean that we humans build our theories about ourselves after the fact? "This post hoc interpreting process has implications for and an impact on the big questions of free will and determinism."
Gazzaniga cites research by Hakwan Lau of Columbia University that purports to show how the brain could lead the mind into thinking that the explanation developed by The Interpreter after a certain behavior was an intention occurring before a spontaneous action occurred; in essence, tricking the mind into thinking that the explanation was an intention. Lau discovered that an area of the brain in the frontal cortex known as the supplemental motor area (SMA) (involved with planning of motor actions that are sequences of action done from memory). An area called the pre-SMA is involved with creating new sequences of action in memory, which gives one the feeling of the urge to move (perhaps not unlike my getting out of bed in the morning to read Gazzaniga's book). It is the pre-SMA area that is activated when humans generate actions of their own choice. Lau applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the pre-SMA that locally activates nerve cells in the pre-SMA. Describing Lau's research, Gazzaniga explains: "When TMS is applied over the pre-SMA after the execution of a spontaneous action, the perceived onset of the intention to act, that moment when you become conscious that you intend to act, is shifted backward in time on the temporal map, and the perceived time of the actual action, the moment when you are conscious that your acting, is shifted forward in time." In other words, the perceived onset of intention depends, at least in part, on neural activity that takes place after the execution of action. While Lau is careful to say that without further experimentation "one cannot draw the strong conclusion that the experience of having conscious control of a simple motor action [e.g. getting out of bed in the morning] is entirely illusory," he adds that his experimental "results throw doubt on the commonsensical view that the experience of intention, including the experienced onset, is completely determined before an action." Lau adds, "An alternative view that is compatible with the data is that one function of the experience of intention [even if it occurs afterwards] might be to help clarify the ownership of actions, which can help to guide future actions." Gazzaniga concludes, however, that The Interpreter "makes the story fit with the pleasing idea one actually willed the action." Free will is illusory, he says.
There is certainly no consensus among neuroscientists and psychologists over this research, just as thousands of years of philosophical debate has not achieved consensus about free-will. But one truth about free-will drawn from the philosophical debate is that it is at least a theoretical construct used to justify the notion of personal responsibility for one's actions. And that leads to the discussion of whether our free-will, if it really does exist, is limited to self-control and regulating existing tendencies of human behavior that are selfish or impulsive or emotionally driven? This is where I think Jaak Panksepp is coming from (see previous post) when he says, "At primary-process levels of emotional processing there is no free will, there is no 'controlled cognitions.' Neither do the automatic secondary processes of learning and memory functions, that are molded by our wild animal passions developmentally, exhibit free will. That can only emerge from well-sculpted, deeply reflective, cognitive attitudes." Free-will is reflected in those "controlled cognitions" that respond to the neocortex being energized by the emotional systems of the subcortical areas of the brain. There is consensus that the ability to deliberate and rationally choose between different courses of actions. As Antonio Damasio has documented in Looking for Spinoza and Descartes Error, choosing between different courses of action is not an act of cognition alone, but of cognition and emotion in tandem. (See also April 8, 2011 post). There are certain emotions that are linked with feelings of responsibility such as sympathy and regret and these emotions do not originate in the cortex where the brain's "executive control" is said to reside.
Yet what inspires those controlled cognitions? I submit it is memory and culture and our body's biochemistry. And that brings us to Gazzaniga's chapter on the "the social mind," a subject that is covered in many previous posts dealing with mirror neurons, mimicry, moral feelings and related emotions. (See November 21, 2012, September 17, 2012, September 12, 2012, December 10, 2011, posts). Gazzaniga endorses this point of view. Echoing Christopher Boehm (see November 21, 2012 post), Gazzaniga writes, "If Michael Tomasello and Brian Hare are correct that we have been domesticating ourselves over thousands of years through ostracizing and killing those who were too aggressive, in essence removing them from the gene pool and modifying our social environment, then we have been making rules for groups to live by and enforcing them throughout our evolutionary history." Gazzaniga adds, "The culture to which we belong actually plays a significant role in shaping some of our cognitive processes." And in terms of our biochemistry, Gazzaniga notes, "'Easterners and Westerners also vary in their genetic makeup . . . Much research had already shown that serotonin plays a part in attention, cognitive flexibility, and long-term memory, so [researchers] decided that looking into a specific serotonin system polymorphism (a DNA sequence variation), which was known to affect an individual's mode of thinking, could prove fruitful [in accounting for differences in attention across cultures]. They looked at different alleles (genes which have different nucleic acid sequences occupying the same position on a paired chromosome that control the same inherited characteristic) of the 5-HTRIA gene that ultimately controls neurotransmission of serotonin. They found that there was a significant interaction between the type of 5-HTRIA alleles a person had and the culture in which he lived. This interaction affected where that particular person's attention was directed. Those person processing the identical DNA sequences in the matched gene pairs (homozygous) G allege, which is associated with the reduced ability to adapt to changes, more strongly endorse the culturally reinforced mode of thinking than those with homozygous C allele. . . Summarizing these findings, these researchers concluded, 'The same genetic predispositions can result in different psychological outcomes, depending on an individual's cultural context.'"
Gazzaniga suggests that what is sorely needed in this discussion is new terminology, which may be another way of saying that the discussion needs to be repurposed. For example, we can abandon thousands of years of debate that this discussion is between causal determinism and free-will. This is essentially conceding to neuroscientists and others that our actions are determined in many respects by biology and the environment (including culture), and that cognition is not truly independent of biology and the environment. Professors Ryan and Deci at the University of Rochester and others use a different terminology, "self-determination" and autonomy (self-regulation). Self-determination and autonomy are not liberated from causal influences that motivate behavior ("people's autonomy lies not in being independent causes but in exercising their capacity to reflectively endorse or reject prompted actions"). They are not "free" in that sense. Critical to these terms is that our neocortex "assents" to whatever we have been motivated to do after some reflection. This rules out instinctive, habitual, unconscious behavior, and since we arguably assent habitually to much of our behavior each day without much reflection, it focuses on true choices. This cognitive scenario may very well involve a narrow subset of human life. I would think this is heavily an exercise exhibiting self-control.
Responsibility is a social construct, Gazzaniga says, echoing John Searle's deontological view of how humans construct a social reality. (See February 24, 2013 post). "Responsibility is not located in the brain. The brain has no area or network for responsibility. . . the way to think about responsibility is that it is an interaction between people, a social contract. Responsibility reflects a rule that emerges out of one or more agents interacting in a social context, and the hope that we share is that each individual will follow certain rules." But there are aspects of the brain that do lead to this interaction between people in a social context and support the development of rules for responsibility, and we have identified these in prior posts: the emotional systems and structures of the brain that promote care, grief, play, empathy, sympathy, fear, among others. (See May 19, 2013 post and November 21, 2012 post).
I awaken at 5:30 in the morning. Gradually my mind becomes cognitive (conscious) again. My body is telling me to stay put. Don't get up. Rest some more. I lie still for many more minutes, and inevitably my mind starts to race about what I need to do (or don't need to do) in the coming day. I need to get out of bed and start doing things. But when? I can probably afford to lie in bed until 7am and still do what I need to do over the course of the remaining day. I lie still for awhile longer. It is now forty-five minutes later. My mind wrestles with whether I should continue to try and rest or get out of bed and start being active. I cannot lie still anymore. I tell myself I will get out of bed and read a chapter of Michael Gazzaniga's book, Who's In Charge? and I do. I had a decision to make and I made it: I got out of bed at 6:15am instead of perhaps 7am. Is that what free-will is all about? What was I free from? No one else was dictating that I stay in bed. There was no social rule telling me I had to stay in bed until 7am. My body was not chained to the bed. But was this decision entirely unchained from all causes? Jaak Panskepp has compellingly explained that our Seeking urges begin with our automatic impulses deep in the subcortical areas of our brain, (see previous post), so perhaps my urge to read and learn and cease lying down was something less than volitional?
Much of what we humans and other animals do in our lives is automatic, unconscious, instinctive. As Panksepp points out, even learning, memory, and habit formation is unconscious. What is learned and habitual is not the stuff of choices and decision trees, and yet choice is what free will is purportedly about. And choice, the hallmark of "who's in charge," is typically assigned to the neocortex of the brain that resides on top of the limbic system and the forebrain. Yet if we concur with Panksepp that it is the brain's subcortical emotional system that energizes the neocortex, not the other way around, the role of the neocortex appears to be only regulatory of the urges that come from below the cortex: controlling and inhibiting impulses, instinct, and habit, not initiating behavior in the first instance.
For Gazzaniga, neuroscience (the study of the brain) does not offer much support for the common understanding of free will. The evidence from neuroscience is inconsistent with free will. Gazzaniga's first point is that there is no single executive decision center in the brain. The brain is composed of distinct modules, and while we may have a unified sense of self and making decisions, neuroscience does not support our sense that we are making decisions entirely liberated from either the environment around us or within us. Our sense of psychological unity, says Gazzaniga, emerges out of specialized system in the left side of our neocortex, which he call The Interpreter. (See June 12, 2011 post and June 5, 2011 post). This is the area of the brain in which the human tendency to want to explain things is found as well as our capacity for imagination. (See May 22, 2011 post). But as Gazzaniga explains, The Interpreter is slow. It comes to life after the event it seeks to explain has occurred. So what does it mean that we humans build our theories about ourselves after the fact? "This post hoc interpreting process has implications for and an impact on the big questions of free will and determinism."
Gazzaniga cites research by Hakwan Lau of Columbia University that purports to show how the brain could lead the mind into thinking that the explanation developed by The Interpreter after a certain behavior was an intention occurring before a spontaneous action occurred; in essence, tricking the mind into thinking that the explanation was an intention. Lau discovered that an area of the brain in the frontal cortex known as the supplemental motor area (SMA) (involved with planning of motor actions that are sequences of action done from memory). An area called the pre-SMA is involved with creating new sequences of action in memory, which gives one the feeling of the urge to move (perhaps not unlike my getting out of bed in the morning to read Gazzaniga's book). It is the pre-SMA area that is activated when humans generate actions of their own choice. Lau applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the pre-SMA that locally activates nerve cells in the pre-SMA. Describing Lau's research, Gazzaniga explains: "When TMS is applied over the pre-SMA after the execution of a spontaneous action, the perceived onset of the intention to act, that moment when you become conscious that you intend to act, is shifted backward in time on the temporal map, and the perceived time of the actual action, the moment when you are conscious that your acting, is shifted forward in time." In other words, the perceived onset of intention depends, at least in part, on neural activity that takes place after the execution of action. While Lau is careful to say that without further experimentation "one cannot draw the strong conclusion that the experience of having conscious control of a simple motor action [e.g. getting out of bed in the morning] is entirely illusory," he adds that his experimental "results throw doubt on the commonsensical view that the experience of intention, including the experienced onset, is completely determined before an action." Lau adds, "An alternative view that is compatible with the data is that one function of the experience of intention [even if it occurs afterwards] might be to help clarify the ownership of actions, which can help to guide future actions." Gazzaniga concludes, however, that The Interpreter "makes the story fit with the pleasing idea one actually willed the action." Free will is illusory, he says.
There is certainly no consensus among neuroscientists and psychologists over this research, just as thousands of years of philosophical debate has not achieved consensus about free-will. But one truth about free-will drawn from the philosophical debate is that it is at least a theoretical construct used to justify the notion of personal responsibility for one's actions. And that leads to the discussion of whether our free-will, if it really does exist, is limited to self-control and regulating existing tendencies of human behavior that are selfish or impulsive or emotionally driven? This is where I think Jaak Panksepp is coming from (see previous post) when he says, "At primary-process levels of emotional processing there is no free will, there is no 'controlled cognitions.' Neither do the automatic secondary processes of learning and memory functions, that are molded by our wild animal passions developmentally, exhibit free will. That can only emerge from well-sculpted, deeply reflective, cognitive attitudes." Free-will is reflected in those "controlled cognitions" that respond to the neocortex being energized by the emotional systems of the subcortical areas of the brain. There is consensus that the ability to deliberate and rationally choose between different courses of actions. As Antonio Damasio has documented in Looking for Spinoza and Descartes Error, choosing between different courses of action is not an act of cognition alone, but of cognition and emotion in tandem. (See also April 8, 2011 post). There are certain emotions that are linked with feelings of responsibility such as sympathy and regret and these emotions do not originate in the cortex where the brain's "executive control" is said to reside.
Yet what inspires those controlled cognitions? I submit it is memory and culture and our body's biochemistry. And that brings us to Gazzaniga's chapter on the "the social mind," a subject that is covered in many previous posts dealing with mirror neurons, mimicry, moral feelings and related emotions. (See November 21, 2012, September 17, 2012, September 12, 2012, December 10, 2011, posts). Gazzaniga endorses this point of view. Echoing Christopher Boehm (see November 21, 2012 post), Gazzaniga writes, "If Michael Tomasello and Brian Hare are correct that we have been domesticating ourselves over thousands of years through ostracizing and killing those who were too aggressive, in essence removing them from the gene pool and modifying our social environment, then we have been making rules for groups to live by and enforcing them throughout our evolutionary history." Gazzaniga adds, "The culture to which we belong actually plays a significant role in shaping some of our cognitive processes." And in terms of our biochemistry, Gazzaniga notes, "'Easterners and Westerners also vary in their genetic makeup . . . Much research had already shown that serotonin plays a part in attention, cognitive flexibility, and long-term memory, so [researchers] decided that looking into a specific serotonin system polymorphism (a DNA sequence variation), which was known to affect an individual's mode of thinking, could prove fruitful [in accounting for differences in attention across cultures]. They looked at different alleles (genes which have different nucleic acid sequences occupying the same position on a paired chromosome that control the same inherited characteristic) of the 5-HTRIA gene that ultimately controls neurotransmission of serotonin. They found that there was a significant interaction between the type of 5-HTRIA alleles a person had and the culture in which he lived. This interaction affected where that particular person's attention was directed. Those person processing the identical DNA sequences in the matched gene pairs (homozygous) G allege, which is associated with the reduced ability to adapt to changes, more strongly endorse the culturally reinforced mode of thinking than those with homozygous C allele. . . Summarizing these findings, these researchers concluded, 'The same genetic predispositions can result in different psychological outcomes, depending on an individual's cultural context.'"
Gazzaniga suggests that what is sorely needed in this discussion is new terminology, which may be another way of saying that the discussion needs to be repurposed. For example, we can abandon thousands of years of debate that this discussion is between causal determinism and free-will. This is essentially conceding to neuroscientists and others that our actions are determined in many respects by biology and the environment (including culture), and that cognition is not truly independent of biology and the environment. Professors Ryan and Deci at the University of Rochester and others use a different terminology, "self-determination" and autonomy (self-regulation). Self-determination and autonomy are not liberated from causal influences that motivate behavior ("people's autonomy lies not in being independent causes but in exercising their capacity to reflectively endorse or reject prompted actions"). They are not "free" in that sense. Critical to these terms is that our neocortex "assents" to whatever we have been motivated to do after some reflection. This rules out instinctive, habitual, unconscious behavior, and since we arguably assent habitually to much of our behavior each day without much reflection, it focuses on true choices. This cognitive scenario may very well involve a narrow subset of human life. I would think this is heavily an exercise exhibiting self-control.
Responsibility is a social construct, Gazzaniga says, echoing John Searle's deontological view of how humans construct a social reality. (See February 24, 2013 post). "Responsibility is not located in the brain. The brain has no area or network for responsibility. . . the way to think about responsibility is that it is an interaction between people, a social contract. Responsibility reflects a rule that emerges out of one or more agents interacting in a social context, and the hope that we share is that each individual will follow certain rules." But there are aspects of the brain that do lead to this interaction between people in a social context and support the development of rules for responsibility, and we have identified these in prior posts: the emotional systems and structures of the brain that promote care, grief, play, empathy, sympathy, fear, among others. (See May 19, 2013 post and November 21, 2012 post).
Saturday, November 27, 2010
Matt Ridley, Genome (1999)
A television show, Law and Order, opens each episode with a narrative line about the role of the police and prosecutors in the criminal justice system, which closes, "And these are their stories." Matt Ridley might have opened Genome by stating, "There are 23 chromosomes that make up the human genome, and each have special roles (plural) in determining or influencing our development, our physical attributes, our behavior, the kind of diseases we suffer or have immunity from, how long we might live, and when we might die. And these are their stories." Don't misunderstand me. Genome is not a complete encyclopedia of either genomics or the human genome. Just 23 interesting stories from one of the world's fine science writers, each story artfully tied to one of the 23 human chromosomes, from largest to smallest, covering topics such as life, species, history, fate, environment, intelligence, instinct, self-interest, sex, disease, stress, personality, development, life and death, memory, gene therapy, politics and ethics, eugenics, free will and determinism. The breadth of the subject-matter covered by this volume speaks to almost all of the topics covered by the books previously described in this blog, including a central theme: that units of information are the most fundamental units of life. (See September 28, 2010 post).
Ridley calls the genome a book, the chromosome a chapter, the gene a story, an exon a paragraph, a codon a word consisting of three letters, and a base is a letter, either (in the case of DNA) an A, C, G, or T (or U in the case of RNA), for adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine, each consisting of one or two aromatic rings and arrangements of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and/or oxygen atoms. These chemical units are the basic units of information that comprise life forms, but alone they do not give rise to life. What gives rise to life is (1) the pairing of these letters along a double helix that makes up DNA, and (2) their subsequent transcription into RNA to form three letter codons, which, (3) are subsequently "translated" into a specific amino acid depending on which three of the four letters are transcribed and their sequence. (4) The particular chain of amino acids creates a protein. By this process, it is said that "genes" code for "proteins." While the RNA amino acid chains may have been the earliest form of life, "life" as we know it received a boost with the creation of cellular membranes to form the first cells that carried the proteins containing genetic information central for the cell's organization. This development is still not fully understood.
This ability of the genes to copy themselves, read and transmit their story, under the right conditions, is the ability to create another life form. My son once asked asked me, "What is Life?" a question posed in his high school biology class, and I replied that at its most fundamental level it is carbon-based, with a mechanism to replicate itself. The only two things I would add, consistent with the very first book discussed in this blog, Seth Lloyd's Programming the Universe (see August 17, 2009 post) is the ability of these units of information to communicate among themselves --- an electrochemical means --- to say "Let's stick together," or "Let's avoid each other," and then to store itself as if in memory. This is what we find in the genome, whatever the species.
This story never ceases to amaze me. Life began with RNA --- which by itself can replicate itself, and translate and transmit its meaning, as well as catalyze with --- break up or join with --- other chemicals, creating amino acids and proteins. The storage device for these words and paragraphs is DNA. An RNA gene found on chromosome 1 translates the information found in DNA to proteins, which become the primary agent for carrying out the direction specified by the information contained in the genes within a cell.
I cannot cover every "chapter" in Genome, but four topics that reappear throughout this blog --- so we can connect the dots --- are important in my mind: (1) is behavior found in our genes? (2) the role of our genes in our development after birth, (3) human memory and the mind; and (4) determinism vs. free will.
Is behavior found in our genes? This topic was first confronted in the post on Richard Powers' novel Generosity (November 30, 2009 post), Frans DeWaal's The Ape and The Sushi Master (June 17, 2010 post), and subsequently Oren Harman's The Price of Altruism (October 13, 2010 post). The answer then, as it is now, is no. There is no gene for spitting or laughing or speaking English or for believing in a god. What genes do code for enables or influences behavior, but they do not determine specific behavior. Just as it would be incorrect to say that behavior is entirely written in our genes, it would also be incorrect to state that behavior is entirely attributable to environment, including the nurturing, learning, social and cultural environments. Behavior is the outcome of the genome that defines us and the environment in which we develop and live.
Ridley notes the significance of instinct, something which was important to Darwin in The Origin of Species. Behavior that is instinctive to a species is arguably heavily enabled or influenced by genetic information. So we may refer to a language instinct, to borrow Steven Pinker's words, but a language instinct does not develop without some environmental influence. The genes that become proteins instruct the creation of the mouth, the tongue, and the air passages that enable human speech, and further instruct in the creation of the modules of the brain and the neuronal pathways between them that enable human speech and perhaps even language syntax. But at some point in the course of a life, learning takes over. The ability to learn --- social behavior --- is also something that is enabled or influenced by genetic information, but genes are not the end of the story.
The role of genes in development. This story was detailed in Sean Carroll's book Endless Forms Most Beautiful, which accounted for the role of the Hox and hedgehog genes in providing a program for both embyonic development and development after birth. These genes regulate cell division, the timing at which genes are switched on to control development, and determine such things as symmetry in the body of an animal, where arms, legs, antennae, fins, fingers and the like appear. Ridley retells this story on Chromosome 12. This is one of the most fascinating stories in evolutionary genetics as these are among the oldest of genes.
Memory. One of the more important subjects in the study of the brain is its plasticity, the brain's ability to change by removing, adding or strengthening neural connections. "When you learn something," Ridley notes, "you alter the physical network of your brain so as to create new, tight connections where there were none or weaker ones before." Connections between never cells "not only provide the mechanism of memory, but are memory." Ridley is not clear on how specific genes are tied to learning and memory, but he suggests that proteins connected with certain genes "are probably needed for holding the synapse closely together." We know more about the process by which memories are created and stored in the brain: sensory information is received in the perirhinal cortex found in the medial temporal lobe and sent to the hippocampus and to the diencephalon for temporary storage. If the information is significant enough for more permanent storage, it is sent back to the neo-cortex as long-term memory. Eric Kandel's research, documented in his memoir, In Search of Memory, traces the electro-chemical process in the brain by which connections between the neuronal connections at the synapses of neurons are strengthened.
Learning "is the opposite of instinct," Ridley says. "Instinct is genetically-determined behavior; learning is behavior modified by experience. . . .Human beings achieve by instinct the same things that animals do. We crawl, stand, walk, cry and blink in just as instinctive a way as a chick. We employ learning only for the extra things we have grafted on to the animal instincts: things like reading, driving, banking and shopping." Consciousness, Ridley quotes another, "is to enable [the child] to learn things which natural heredity fails to transmit." The brain is created by genes that designed the brain to be modified by experience.
Determinism vs free-will. The final chapter is almost whimsical --not truly a story about Chromosome 23, but an excuse to pontificate on whether free-will is possible given that a combination of genetics and the environment seems to determine everything about us. Free-will, in my view, if it exists, is enabled by the brain --- it is tied to the same type of issues that Ridley discusses in connection with learning and memory. Human behavior, says Ridley, is unpredictable in the short-term, but quite predictable in the long-term. As an example, he cites that at any given time during a day one can choose to eat or not to eat, but over the course of a day one will have to eat. When one eats is a function of genetic and external influences that makes behavior unpredictable, but not undetermined. "Freedom lies in expressing your own determinism:" being able to control voluntary movement in the gap between short-term when behavior is unpredictable and the long-term when it is predictably determined, It is in the brain of humans, and perhaps some other animals, that the ability to control voluntarily movement is found. And genes have enabled this ability in the design of the brain.
Ridley calls the genome a book, the chromosome a chapter, the gene a story, an exon a paragraph, a codon a word consisting of three letters, and a base is a letter, either (in the case of DNA) an A, C, G, or T (or U in the case of RNA), for adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine, each consisting of one or two aromatic rings and arrangements of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and/or oxygen atoms. These chemical units are the basic units of information that comprise life forms, but alone they do not give rise to life. What gives rise to life is (1) the pairing of these letters along a double helix that makes up DNA, and (2) their subsequent transcription into RNA to form three letter codons, which, (3) are subsequently "translated" into a specific amino acid depending on which three of the four letters are transcribed and their sequence. (4) The particular chain of amino acids creates a protein. By this process, it is said that "genes" code for "proteins." While the RNA amino acid chains may have been the earliest form of life, "life" as we know it received a boost with the creation of cellular membranes to form the first cells that carried the proteins containing genetic information central for the cell's organization. This development is still not fully understood.
This ability of the genes to copy themselves, read and transmit their story, under the right conditions, is the ability to create another life form. My son once asked asked me, "What is Life?" a question posed in his high school biology class, and I replied that at its most fundamental level it is carbon-based, with a mechanism to replicate itself. The only two things I would add, consistent with the very first book discussed in this blog, Seth Lloyd's Programming the Universe (see August 17, 2009 post) is the ability of these units of information to communicate among themselves --- an electrochemical means --- to say "Let's stick together," or "Let's avoid each other," and then to store itself as if in memory. This is what we find in the genome, whatever the species.
This story never ceases to amaze me. Life began with RNA --- which by itself can replicate itself, and translate and transmit its meaning, as well as catalyze with --- break up or join with --- other chemicals, creating amino acids and proteins. The storage device for these words and paragraphs is DNA. An RNA gene found on chromosome 1 translates the information found in DNA to proteins, which become the primary agent for carrying out the direction specified by the information contained in the genes within a cell.
I cannot cover every "chapter" in Genome, but four topics that reappear throughout this blog --- so we can connect the dots --- are important in my mind: (1) is behavior found in our genes? (2) the role of our genes in our development after birth, (3) human memory and the mind; and (4) determinism vs. free will.
Is behavior found in our genes? This topic was first confronted in the post on Richard Powers' novel Generosity (November 30, 2009 post), Frans DeWaal's The Ape and The Sushi Master (June 17, 2010 post), and subsequently Oren Harman's The Price of Altruism (October 13, 2010 post). The answer then, as it is now, is no. There is no gene for spitting or laughing or speaking English or for believing in a god. What genes do code for enables or influences behavior, but they do not determine specific behavior. Just as it would be incorrect to say that behavior is entirely written in our genes, it would also be incorrect to state that behavior is entirely attributable to environment, including the nurturing, learning, social and cultural environments. Behavior is the outcome of the genome that defines us and the environment in which we develop and live.
Ridley notes the significance of instinct, something which was important to Darwin in The Origin of Species. Behavior that is instinctive to a species is arguably heavily enabled or influenced by genetic information. So we may refer to a language instinct, to borrow Steven Pinker's words, but a language instinct does not develop without some environmental influence. The genes that become proteins instruct the creation of the mouth, the tongue, and the air passages that enable human speech, and further instruct in the creation of the modules of the brain and the neuronal pathways between them that enable human speech and perhaps even language syntax. But at some point in the course of a life, learning takes over. The ability to learn --- social behavior --- is also something that is enabled or influenced by genetic information, but genes are not the end of the story.
The role of genes in development. This story was detailed in Sean Carroll's book Endless Forms Most Beautiful, which accounted for the role of the Hox and hedgehog genes in providing a program for both embyonic development and development after birth. These genes regulate cell division, the timing at which genes are switched on to control development, and determine such things as symmetry in the body of an animal, where arms, legs, antennae, fins, fingers and the like appear. Ridley retells this story on Chromosome 12. This is one of the most fascinating stories in evolutionary genetics as these are among the oldest of genes.
Memory. One of the more important subjects in the study of the brain is its plasticity, the brain's ability to change by removing, adding or strengthening neural connections. "When you learn something," Ridley notes, "you alter the physical network of your brain so as to create new, tight connections where there were none or weaker ones before." Connections between never cells "not only provide the mechanism of memory, but are memory." Ridley is not clear on how specific genes are tied to learning and memory, but he suggests that proteins connected with certain genes "are probably needed for holding the synapse closely together." We know more about the process by which memories are created and stored in the brain: sensory information is received in the perirhinal cortex found in the medial temporal lobe and sent to the hippocampus and to the diencephalon for temporary storage. If the information is significant enough for more permanent storage, it is sent back to the neo-cortex as long-term memory. Eric Kandel's research, documented in his memoir, In Search of Memory, traces the electro-chemical process in the brain by which connections between the neuronal connections at the synapses of neurons are strengthened.
Learning "is the opposite of instinct," Ridley says. "Instinct is genetically-determined behavior; learning is behavior modified by experience. . . .Human beings achieve by instinct the same things that animals do. We crawl, stand, walk, cry and blink in just as instinctive a way as a chick. We employ learning only for the extra things we have grafted on to the animal instincts: things like reading, driving, banking and shopping." Consciousness, Ridley quotes another, "is to enable [the child] to learn things which natural heredity fails to transmit." The brain is created by genes that designed the brain to be modified by experience.
Determinism vs free-will. The final chapter is almost whimsical --not truly a story about Chromosome 23, but an excuse to pontificate on whether free-will is possible given that a combination of genetics and the environment seems to determine everything about us. Free-will, in my view, if it exists, is enabled by the brain --- it is tied to the same type of issues that Ridley discusses in connection with learning and memory. Human behavior, says Ridley, is unpredictable in the short-term, but quite predictable in the long-term. As an example, he cites that at any given time during a day one can choose to eat or not to eat, but over the course of a day one will have to eat. When one eats is a function of genetic and external influences that makes behavior unpredictable, but not undetermined. "Freedom lies in expressing your own determinism:" being able to control voluntary movement in the gap between short-term when behavior is unpredictable and the long-term when it is predictably determined, It is in the brain of humans, and perhaps some other animals, that the ability to control voluntarily movement is found. And genes have enabled this ability in the design of the brain.
Friday, September 18, 2009
Marco Iacoboni, Mirroring People (2008)
This important volume might have been titled The Feeling of What Happens (To Other People), but the neurology community would have immediately recognized a title borrowed from a crosstown Los Angeles rival, Antonio Damassio's The Feeling of What Happens (1999). In both Iacoboni and Damassio, you have two preeminent neuroscientists on the leading edge of brain research writing accessible books about their research for the public. Both connect their brain research to a philosophy of the mind that we used to study before science supplanted philosophy and unified our understanding of the mind and brain. In Iacoboni's case, the philosophical tradition is rooted in the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with a tip to William James. In Damassio's case, the spirit of James is clearly acknowledged, but Damassio finds his roots in Spinoza's rejection of Descartes' dualism of mind and body, as explained in Descartes Error (1994) and Looking for Spinoza (2004). There is something in common between these two besides William James. That the mind is an extension of the body is a view shared by both Spinoza and phenomenologists, and they share the view that Descartes was wrong or at least problematic.
Damassio's attention is directed at consciousness, feelings, emotions and cognition, a breathtaking subject-matter that many believe will ultimately be understood and explained through neurological research. Iacoboni's research fits within the landscape of this huge topic, but it is more focused, describing the research begun by colleagues in Parma, Italy in the 1980s on macaque monkeys that resulted in the discovery of mirror neurons. Interestingly, the word 'consciousness' is not mentioned once in Mirroring People, although Iacoboni's discussion of one's sense of self and sense of others does relate to consciousness. In contrast, Damassio acknowledges the role of mirror neurons in cognitive processes related to emotion and feelings.
So what are these mirror neurons, what are their significance, and what do they mean for our history of ideas? Mirror neurons are a type of brain cell that fire in response to a perceived action of another. It just so happens that the same neuron fires in response to the self undertaking the same action. They are found in several parts of the brain, but importantly they are found in the premotor cortex -- a part of the neocortex responsible for planning and executing actions. The same cells fire in response to perception and action. This is true for humans and other primates.
Research indicates that mirror neurons are important to ascribing intentions to others even when they have not declared their intention. When we see or hear an action undertaken by an "other," we understand their intentions by simulating (or imitating) them in our brain. Different cells fire with respect to a different action (revealing a different perceived intention) on the same object. It is as if you could say, I know what you are thinking, or, I feel your pain. Mirror neurons are clearly important to cognitive and emotional states critical to our understanding of and relationships with others, such as empathy and mental conditions such as autism, as well as our own actions. The phrase "No man is an island" takes on greater meaning because of the discovery of mirron neurons. Interdependence is a biological fact. Subjectivity is said to be a characteristic of the individual mind, but for Iacoboni, intersubjectivity is something we ought to be seriously looking at.
Our understanding of mirror neurons is an important key to understanding and resolving the age-old debate as to whether nature or nurture is responsible for our behavior. It is clearly both, and the research undertaken by Iacoboni and others at UCLA seems to confirm this. Mirror neurons are present at birth, and we know this because the infant begins to imitate its parents and others from the beginning. The mirror neurons begin to fire for the first time and are continuously developed through interaction with others and our environment. This process appears to continue through our lives as we grow to become part of group, community or society, as mirror neuron research shows that these neurons fire more strongly when we hear or see something that is associated with the family, group, community or society that we affiliate with and interact most closely. Mirror neuron research strongly supports Evo Devo, evolutionary developmental biology. For example, in the case of humans. our gestation period in the womb is not long enough for the complete development of the brain, which continues to grow in the post-natal stage. If this were not the case, our head would be too large to pass through the brith canal. Human evolution has tied our survival to coming into the world in a state of helplessness, and only through post-natal development of the brain is our species' chances for survival enhanced. Strikingly, this development occurs almost immediately because of personal or social interaction with parents and others in the immediate family or community. Christine Kenneally's survey of language research, The First Word, reviewed below, demonstrates that language development fits this model as well.
So is our identity defined entirely by those around us, or is there a unique "self?" Self and other are "inextricably blended," says Iacoboni. The sense of self follows the sense of "us," which is the first "sense" of awareness an infant has immediately following its birth as a result of mother infant interactions. We are social animals first. The human's sense of self emerges in time. Interestingly, mirror neuron research has established that these neurons fire more strongly when we are perceiving ourselves as opposed to perceiving an other. Biologically, this might explain why humans view themselves more as independent individuals, rather than interdependent members of the same species.
Mirror neuron research, opines Iacoboni, suggests that the individual in western social and political philosophy is not as unique as we think, and further indicates that our western concept of free will might have to be revised. "Mirror neurons in our brains produce automatic imitative influences of which we are often unaware and that limit our autonomy by means of powerful social influences. We humans are social animals, yet our sociality makes us social agents with limited autonomy." This sounds threatening to the value system underlying western social, economic and political organization, but Iacoboni does not try to develop or elaborate on this thought any further. In contrast, Damassio's synthesis of the mind and body has its roots in Spinoza, who is probably more responsible for our western political system than any other philosopher of the Enlightenment. And for Spinoza, who rejected the separation of the physicality of emotions from the rational operations of the mind, free will found its expression in human choice. Iacoboni does not say that humans are without choice; he writes only in terms of "limited autonomy."
OK, so our choices are influenced, perhaps powerfully, by our social environment. But Iacoboni appears to suggest that if humans had wider, less insular social interaction and presumably more choices in belief systems to identify with, that we might come to appreciate how interdependent we are. He writes, "[T]rue cross-cultural encounters are actually made impossible by the influence of massive belief systems --- religious and political -- that deny continuously the fundamental neurobiology that links us together." There is not one monolithic belief system that controls us or renders free will a total illusion. Iacoboni refers to "belief systems" --- plural --- and, not surprisingly, there is conflict in these belief systems. Spinoza's life story is a story of choice among competing belief systems --- a true cross-cultural encounter that was not made impossible by the influence of a massive belief system. His life was an exercise of free will. And if we revise our notion of free will (which implicitly, if not explicitly recognizes that our choices are not free of all influence), what will we gain in terms of insight?
I see a larger volume on the human mind and mirror neurons in the future: a volume that more completely integrates the role of mirror neurons with the biological and psychological and emotional operations of the mind and body, discusses consciousness and memory, and the evolution and development of the brain. Iacoboni only briefly introduces the role of the limbic system in the brain that allows us to feel emotions, but he does not discuss the relationship of the mirror neurons in the brain to the central nervous system, nor does he explore the evolution of the brain (or mirror neurons for that matter), which is more fully explored by Damassio and also by Steven Rose in The Future of the Brain. These are not shortcomings of this important summary on the discovery of and subsequent research about the role of mirror neurons. More research will be needed before the next volume is written.
Damassio's attention is directed at consciousness, feelings, emotions and cognition, a breathtaking subject-matter that many believe will ultimately be understood and explained through neurological research. Iacoboni's research fits within the landscape of this huge topic, but it is more focused, describing the research begun by colleagues in Parma, Italy in the 1980s on macaque monkeys that resulted in the discovery of mirror neurons. Interestingly, the word 'consciousness' is not mentioned once in Mirroring People, although Iacoboni's discussion of one's sense of self and sense of others does relate to consciousness. In contrast, Damassio acknowledges the role of mirror neurons in cognitive processes related to emotion and feelings.
So what are these mirror neurons, what are their significance, and what do they mean for our history of ideas? Mirror neurons are a type of brain cell that fire in response to a perceived action of another. It just so happens that the same neuron fires in response to the self undertaking the same action. They are found in several parts of the brain, but importantly they are found in the premotor cortex -- a part of the neocortex responsible for planning and executing actions. The same cells fire in response to perception and action. This is true for humans and other primates.
Research indicates that mirror neurons are important to ascribing intentions to others even when they have not declared their intention. When we see or hear an action undertaken by an "other," we understand their intentions by simulating (or imitating) them in our brain. Different cells fire with respect to a different action (revealing a different perceived intention) on the same object. It is as if you could say, I know what you are thinking, or, I feel your pain. Mirror neurons are clearly important to cognitive and emotional states critical to our understanding of and relationships with others, such as empathy and mental conditions such as autism, as well as our own actions. The phrase "No man is an island" takes on greater meaning because of the discovery of mirron neurons. Interdependence is a biological fact. Subjectivity is said to be a characteristic of the individual mind, but for Iacoboni, intersubjectivity is something we ought to be seriously looking at.
Our understanding of mirror neurons is an important key to understanding and resolving the age-old debate as to whether nature or nurture is responsible for our behavior. It is clearly both, and the research undertaken by Iacoboni and others at UCLA seems to confirm this. Mirror neurons are present at birth, and we know this because the infant begins to imitate its parents and others from the beginning. The mirror neurons begin to fire for the first time and are continuously developed through interaction with others and our environment. This process appears to continue through our lives as we grow to become part of group, community or society, as mirror neuron research shows that these neurons fire more strongly when we hear or see something that is associated with the family, group, community or society that we affiliate with and interact most closely. Mirror neuron research strongly supports Evo Devo, evolutionary developmental biology. For example, in the case of humans. our gestation period in the womb is not long enough for the complete development of the brain, which continues to grow in the post-natal stage. If this were not the case, our head would be too large to pass through the brith canal. Human evolution has tied our survival to coming into the world in a state of helplessness, and only through post-natal development of the brain is our species' chances for survival enhanced. Strikingly, this development occurs almost immediately because of personal or social interaction with parents and others in the immediate family or community. Christine Kenneally's survey of language research, The First Word, reviewed below, demonstrates that language development fits this model as well.
So is our identity defined entirely by those around us, or is there a unique "self?" Self and other are "inextricably blended," says Iacoboni. The sense of self follows the sense of "us," which is the first "sense" of awareness an infant has immediately following its birth as a result of mother infant interactions. We are social animals first. The human's sense of self emerges in time. Interestingly, mirror neuron research has established that these neurons fire more strongly when we are perceiving ourselves as opposed to perceiving an other. Biologically, this might explain why humans view themselves more as independent individuals, rather than interdependent members of the same species.
Mirror neuron research, opines Iacoboni, suggests that the individual in western social and political philosophy is not as unique as we think, and further indicates that our western concept of free will might have to be revised. "Mirror neurons in our brains produce automatic imitative influences of which we are often unaware and that limit our autonomy by means of powerful social influences. We humans are social animals, yet our sociality makes us social agents with limited autonomy." This sounds threatening to the value system underlying western social, economic and political organization, but Iacoboni does not try to develop or elaborate on this thought any further. In contrast, Damassio's synthesis of the mind and body has its roots in Spinoza, who is probably more responsible for our western political system than any other philosopher of the Enlightenment. And for Spinoza, who rejected the separation of the physicality of emotions from the rational operations of the mind, free will found its expression in human choice. Iacoboni does not say that humans are without choice; he writes only in terms of "limited autonomy."
OK, so our choices are influenced, perhaps powerfully, by our social environment. But Iacoboni appears to suggest that if humans had wider, less insular social interaction and presumably more choices in belief systems to identify with, that we might come to appreciate how interdependent we are. He writes, "[T]rue cross-cultural encounters are actually made impossible by the influence of massive belief systems --- religious and political -- that deny continuously the fundamental neurobiology that links us together." There is not one monolithic belief system that controls us or renders free will a total illusion. Iacoboni refers to "belief systems" --- plural --- and, not surprisingly, there is conflict in these belief systems. Spinoza's life story is a story of choice among competing belief systems --- a true cross-cultural encounter that was not made impossible by the influence of a massive belief system. His life was an exercise of free will. And if we revise our notion of free will (which implicitly, if not explicitly recognizes that our choices are not free of all influence), what will we gain in terms of insight?
I see a larger volume on the human mind and mirror neurons in the future: a volume that more completely integrates the role of mirror neurons with the biological and psychological and emotional operations of the mind and body, discusses consciousness and memory, and the evolution and development of the brain. Iacoboni only briefly introduces the role of the limbic system in the brain that allows us to feel emotions, but he does not discuss the relationship of the mirror neurons in the brain to the central nervous system, nor does he explore the evolution of the brain (or mirror neurons for that matter), which is more fully explored by Damassio and also by Steven Rose in The Future of the Brain. These are not shortcomings of this important summary on the discovery of and subsequent research about the role of mirror neurons. More research will be needed before the next volume is written.
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