At its most fundamental level, the neurosensory system of every animal, including humans, is a physiological system related to monitoring our entire physical system, whether the animal is awake or not, and, when awake (including the sleep-wake transition period), reacting to stimuli. The latter is referred to as the arousal system. In the case of vertebrates, four neurotransmitters (chemicals) --- acetylcholine, norepinephrine, dopamine, and serotonin --- stimulate different arousal systems originating in the brain stem, evolutionarily the oldest part of the vertebrate brain, and motivate certain behaviors such as seeking food, flight or fight behavior, and sexual activity. There are certain emotional systems that are virtually at the core of the arousal system, at least during periods of wakefulness, and for several decades now, Jaak Panksepp has been researching and advocating that these emotional systems have their origins with animals evolutionarily older than humans, located in the older subcortical areas of mammalian brains and only later connected with the cortical areas.
The Archaeology of Mind begins and ends with vertebrate animals, yet the evolutionary story is older, and to tell the story of what is missing from Panksepp's account I excerpt heavily from Steven Rose's The Future of the Brain, which outlines the evolution of the brain from unicellular organisms, to eukaryotes, to invertebrate animals and vertebrates. This excerpting is important to a point I wish to make. Rose says this:
"By the time that cells capable of metabolism and faithful replication, of symbiogenesis and competition appear, all the defining features of life have emerged: the presence of a semi-permeable boundary separating self from non-self; the ability to metabolise -- that is, to extract energy from the environment so as to maintain this self --- and to self-repair, at least to a degree when damaged; and to reproduce copies of this self more or less faithfully. All of these features require something we may term adaptability or behavior --- the capacity to respond to and act upon the environment in such a way as to enhance survival and replication. At its simplest, this behavior requires neither brains nor nervous systems, albeit a sophisticated set of chemical and structural features. What it does require is the property that some would call a program: at its most general way of describing both the individual chemical components of the cell and the kinetics of their interactions as the cell or living system persists through time. ***
"Built into this program must also be the possibility of modifying its expression, transiently or lastingly, in response to the changing contingencies of the external environment. *** One way of conceiving of this capacity to vary a program is as an action plan, an 'internal representation' of the desired goal-- at its minimum, that of survival at least until replication is achieved. I will be arguing that, in multicellular organisms, such action plans are ultimately what brains are about.
"Amongst the most basic forms of adaptive behavior drawing on such action plans is goal-directed movement-- of a unicell swimming towards food for instance. [Emphasis added]. Dip a thin capillary tube containing a solution of glucose into a drop of bacteria-rich liquid, and the bacteria collect around the mouth of the capillary from which the glucose diffuses--a phenomenon first noted as long ago as the nineteenth century. Such simple responses engage a series of necessary steps. First, the cell needs to be able to sense the food. In the simplest case the food is a source of desirable chemicals --- perhaps sugars or amino acids-- although it may also be the metabolic waste products excreted by another organism. Indeed the molecule does not have to be edible itself provided it can indicate the presence of other molecules that can be metabolized-- that is, it acts as a signal. *** But signals are only signals if there is recipient who can interpret the message they bear. Cell membranes are studded with proteins whose structure is adapted to enable them to trap and bind specific signaling molecules floating past them, and hence read their message. This chemical detection system is the most basic of all sensory mechanisms.
"Interpreting the message --- using it to develop a plan of action -- should make it possible for the cell to determine the direction of the gradient and finally to move up it to the source. Moving towards a specific chemical source --- chemotaxis --- requires that the cell possess some sort of direction indicator or compass. One way of creating such a compass, employed by bacteria, is to swim in a jerky trajectory, enabling the cell to interpret the gradient by comparing the concentration of the attractant chemical at any moment with that a moment before.***"
If Jaak Panksepp were reading this passage he would certainly connect it to his research of emotions in animal brains. It describes the precursor to what Panksepp regards as the most central emotional system in mammals: the SEEKING system (see below). Rose continues:
"The molecules trapped by the receptor on the surface membrane serve as signals, but very weak ones. To produce as dramatic a cellular response as turning and moving in the right direction requires that signals are highly amplified. The mechanism by which this is carried out, even in the seemingly simplest of unicells turns out to be the basis on which the entire complex apparatus of nervous systems and brains is subsequently built. The receptors are large proteins, oriented across the lipid membrane, with regions sticking out into the external environment, and also 'tails' which reach into the interior of the cell (the cytoplasm). When the signal receptor binds to the receptor protein its effect is to force a change -- a twist, if you like -- in the complex shape of the receptor. ***
"One way of speaking of this process, favoured by neurologist Antonio Damasio, even in so limited an animal as Paramecium, is as 'expressing an emotion.' Emotion for Damasio, is a fundamental aspect of existing and a major driver of evolution.
"*** With multicellularity, 'behaviour' becomes a property of the organism as a whole, to which 'needs' of individual cells are subordinated. The internal representation which makes possible the action plan for organism can be delegated to specific cell ensembles. This requires new modes of communication to be developed. Where previously there were only two classes of signals -- those arriving from the external environment to the cell surface, and those internal to the cell --- there are now three. Signals from the external environment are still registered by sensory cells on the surface and are transmuted by molecular cascades with them, but now the response to those cascades requires that further messages be sent from the sensory cells to other regions of the body, including of course the contractile cells. Sometimes the sensory cells make contact with intermediaries whose task it is to synthesise and secrete the necessary 'messenger molecules.' [Emphasis added]. The messengers can then be distributed through the body either by way of a circulatory system or by diffusion through the extracellular space between the body cells, and are detected as before by specialized receptor proteins on the surface membranes of their targets. When molecules that served such messenger functions were first identified in mammals, they were given the generic name of hormones. It was only later, and to some surprise, that it was discovered that many of the same molecules also serve as intercellular signals in very early multicellular organisms, another powerful example of evolutionary conservation.***
"It is easy to imagine a sequence whereby neurons evolved from secretory cells. Instead of discharging their contents generally into the surrounding space and circulatory system, the secretory cells could have put out feelers (called 'processes') enabling them to make direct contact with their targets so as to signal rapidly to them and them alone. Messages could be conveyed between the two either electrically or chemically --- by a depolarizing wave or by secreting a messenger molecule across the membrane at the point where the two cells touch. In fact, both phenomena are know to occur.
"The first step towards such nervous systems can be seen among the large group of Coelenterates, believed to be amongst the earliest true multicellular animals. The best known is perhaps the Hydra, a tiny creature that sits at the bottom of streams attached to rocks or water plants, waving its tentacles above its mouth. When a potential source of food brushes past its tentacles, the Hydra shoots out poisonous threads, collects the paralysed victim and thrusts it into its mouth. *** A well fed Hydra is quiescent; when hungry it waves its tentacles vigorously, or moves its location by repeatedly turning head-over-heals, seeking food-rich or oxygen-rich environments (once again, Damasio would regard these acts 'expressing emotions').***
"What distinguishes a fully-fledged nervous system --- our own for instance --- is a one-way flow of information through the system, from dendrites to axon, from sensory cell to effector. Of course this is mediated via all the feedback loops, but none the less there is a directionality to it that the Hydra's does not possess.
"Whereas the Hydra's neurons are scattered throughout the body, the next crucial step was to concentrate them within an organized system. *** C. elegans has a head and tail end, and as it is more important for it to know where it is going than where it has been, many of its sensory cells are clustered at its head end. From these, nerve connections run to clusters of interneurons, pack into groups (ganglia) with short interconnecting processes between the cells within the group and longer nerve tracts leading out along its gut and ultimately to the effectors: contractile, egg- and sperm producing cells. These neurons use many of the neurotransmitters that are found in mammalian brains (notably the amino acid glutamate), an indication of how far back in evolutionary terms these molecules were adapted for signaling functions.***
"The evolutionary track I have been mapping," writes Rose, "has led from proto-cells to faithfully replicating eukaryotes capable of responding adaptively to patchy environments, from single-celled eukaryotes to multicellular animals with internal signaling systems, and from these to fully-fledged nervous systems capable not merely constructing action plans, but of modifying those plans, at least temporarily, in response to environmental contingencies. But we haven't yet arrived at brains. This must have been the next step along the evolutionary path that led to humans. Concentrating neurons in ganglia is a way of enhancing their interactions and hence their collective power to analyze and respond to incoming stimuli. Locating them at the front end of the organism is the beginning of establishing not merely a nervous system but a brain, though head ganglia or brains only slowly begin to exert their primacy over the other ganglia distributed through the body.*** [Turning to invertebrates] although insect (arthropod) and molluscan neurons are pretty similar to human neurons, and the biochemical motors that drive the system -- their electrically excitable membranes and the neurotransmitters --- work in the same way, the organization of the system is entirely different. In molluscs and arthropods the central ganglion --- the nearest any amongst these huge numbers of species have to a brain --- and the principal connecting pathways between it and other ganglia lie arranged in a ring around their guts. This is a device that can be seen even in earthworms, and it imposes a fundamental design limitation on the complexity of the nervous system.***
"The development of large brains required two major changes in the construction of nervous systems: the separation of the nerves themselves from the gut, and the concentration of nervous power. It also required the first step towards the development of a bony skeleton. Amphioxus, small sea-floor fish, is an example. Less behaviourally sophisticated than octopus or bee, it has a flexible rod of cartilage, a notochord, running down its back --- the forerunner of the spinal column --- with the merit of providing a bracing device against which muscles can pull. More relevantly for the present argument is that eh major nerves and central ganglion lie in a continuous tube running the length of the creature's body, thus disentangling them from the gut and giving space for growth."
We have not even discussed Panksepp's research yet, but there is much here in Steven Rose's account of the evolutionary development of the animal nervous system that indicates the system of neurotransmitters and specialized receptors found in vertebrates long preceded the development of the brain stem in vertebrates. And there is a suggestion by Steven Rose that this system was capable of "expressing emotions," although probably not in the same sense that Panksepp intends. But it would be fair to say that human emotional systems and those of other mammals not only have their origins in vertebrate animals older than humans, but in the earliest forms of life on earth. This is an anthropomorphic view of human emotions as described by Frans DeWaal in The Ape and The Sushi Master (see June 17, 2010 post). To be sure, Panksepp is careful to admonish in his discussion of similarities between the neurological systems of humans and other mammals that "similar does not mean the same." There are similar structures and similar transmitters and receptors in the brain, but their location within the brain may be slightly different or even vastly different, and those differences may result in small or even large differences between humans and other mammals. But in identifying these similarities, Panksepp observes, as the book's subtitle hints, the neuroevolutionary origins of human emotions. Panksepp decries the history of human psychological research that declined to recognize emotions in animals. There is considerable research available today that rebuts that notion.
Panksepp discusses several emotional systems, but central to nearly all of them is what he has labeled the SEEKING system. And in beginning this discussion, we can think back to Steven Rose's reference to the "goal-directed movement-- of a unicell swimming towards food for instance."
Panksepp is controversial within the neuropsychiatric community, challenging some of the dogmas of neuroscience and human psychotherapy. One of the dogmas is reflected in this statement from Rita Carter's Mapping the Mind (see November 6, 2011 post): "A huge volume of evidence suggests that consciousness emerges from the activity of the cerebral cortex that the particular type of consciousness that includes the sense of self requires activation in the frontal lobes. Ask yourself this: Where, precisely, do I feel that "I" am centered? If you are like most people, you will point to a position just above the bridge of your nose. It is right behind here that you will find the prefrontal cortex --- the area of the frontal lobe most closely associated with the generation of consciousness. This region is also responsible for our conscious perception of emotion and our ability to attend and focus. Most important of all, it endows the world with meaning and our lives with a sense of purpose. The symptoms of schizophrenia, depression, mania and Attention Deficit Disorder are mainly due to frontal lobe disorder." Carter's sentiment reflects a view that leads psychotherapists to focus on treating the executive, regulatory capacity of the human brain in the frontal cortex in order to overcome these disorders. While Panksepp does not dismiss the role of the prefrontal cortex in the conscious life of humans, he does disagree with the directionality implicit in this statement: for Panksepp, like Antonio Damasio (see April 8, 2011 post) "the generation of consciousness" begins with the evolutionarily older parts of the brain --- in the midbrain, where neurotransmitters are generated --- as well as the limbic system, which together are at the foundation of the seven emotional systems he describes in Archaeology of Mind. It is here that the "core self" of consciousness emerges, or as Panksepp calls it, the core affective self. The symptoms of certain mental disorders, Panksepp believes, are not "mainly due to frontal lobe disorder" but may have more to do with the imbalanced (excessive or diminished) production of specific chemicals in the brain in the more ancient parts of the brain. And as the previous post suggests, epigenetics provide some explanation in the case of stress disorders caused by early childhood abuse leading to excessive production of cortisol that overwhelms the ability of the limbic system to restore calm.
The seven emotional systems described by Panksepp (and he does not rule out that there may be more) are these:
The Seeking System. This does not immediately sound like it describes an emotional system, but clearly Panksepp is correct in characterizing the Seeking System. This is the system "that allows animals to search for, find and acquire resources that are needed for survival. Arousal of this Seeking System produces all kinds of approach behaviors, but it also feels good in a special way. It is not the kind of pleasure we experience when eating a fine meal, or the satisfaction we feel afterwards. Rather it provides the kind of excited, euphoric anticipation that occurs when we look forward to eating that meal . . . the anticipation of sex . . . the thrill of exploration." Panksepp refers to the Seeking System as the primary process emotional powers that makes animals into active agents in their environments. "Among animals in the wild, it is easy to see the Seeking system in action. Resources are not readily available and animals must persistently seek them out in order to survive. They must hunt or forage for food and search for water, find twigs or dig holes to fashion sheltering nests. The Seeking system urges them to nurture their young, to search for a sexual partner, and when animals live in social communities, to also find nonsexual companions, forming friendships and social alliances. . . Although this system vigorously responds to homeostatic needs, to emotional urges and to enticing temptations, it operates more or less continuously in the background, albeit at much lower levels when people and animals are not in any particular need of resources or troubled by problems that urgently require solutions. This system keeps animals constantly exploring their environments so they can remember where resources are." Importantly, in Panksepp's view, it is the Seeking System that is the motivator behind the intellectual pursuits of the neocortex: "the neocortex does not provide its own motivation; the neocortex is activated by subcortical emotional systems . . . the neocortex is the servant of our emotional systems." It is the Seeking System that urges architects, artists, writers, politicians, and scientists to discover new and better ways to solve problems and express themselves. It "energizes all human creativity." Seeking arousal "is an anticipatory gift of nature that provides seemingly infinite opportunities for learning; with the developmental/epigenetic emergence of higher mental processes, it gradually fine-tunes reasonable expectations, working hypotheses, as in the conduct of science." It is intimately connected with learning, which Panksepp describes as an "automatic, unconscious process that enhances are natural proclivity to engage with the world in ever more subtle ways as our minds mature." In contrast, affect (behavioral outcomes connected to arousal of instinctual emotional systems) is never unconscious; it is felt.
Chemically, the Seeking System is understood to be aroused by dopamine transmitters, but glutamate, which functions in learning and memory, and neuropeptides such as orexin and neurotensin are understood to activate the Seeking System while dynorphin is believed to deactivate it. The neurons for these transmitters are found in the midbrain: anatomically, ventral tegmental area, the medial forebrain bundle, the lateral hypothalamus, the nucleus accumbens, and then running to the medial prefrontal cortex via the mesolimbic and mesocortical dopamine pathways. "In all mammals," notes Panksepp, "the nucleus accumbens interacts with the medial frontal cortex to promote simple appetitive learning (and addictions). Because the Seeking System energizes the frontal neocortical regions, especially the medial zones that focus on immediate emotional needs, we are able to devise strategies to obtain rewards and escape sanctions (pain) and other pitfalls. We remember particularly pleasurable experiences and the possibility of addiction is created. Dopamine transmitters are associated with drugs of abuse, and when they are overly excited there can be negative consequences from addiction. On the other hand, when the Seeking System is underactive, depressive feelings can emerge. Humans differ from other animals here in one important respect; the dopamine pathways that energize the cortex are linked not only to the frontal cortex but to other sensory-perceptual cortices in the back of the brain.
The Rage System. The Rage System needs little explanation: the foundation of anger and aggression. What it is not deserves some explanation: it probably has little to do with war among societies (group aggression), nor is it about predatory aggression such as seeking food. In contrast to the Seeking System, which is largely a "positive" emotion, the Rage System produces unpleasant affects. The Rage System is connected to dominance systems in species. The Rage System runs from the medial areas of the amygdala to the medial hypothalamus to areas of the periaqueductal gray (PAG). As with the Seeking System (and all the other emotional systems Panksepp describes), these are the ancient areas of the brain. The chemicals that can promote rage include testosterone (known to promote physical aggression in males to a greater extent than females), Substance P (important to pain perception), norepinephrine, glutamate, acetylcholine, and nitric oxide synthases. The Rage System can be controlled by chemical inhibitors such as gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and oxytocin.
The Fear System. Similarly, the Fear System needs little explanation. Like the Rage System, it is not a positive emotion; it produces anxiety, stimulates flight, fight or freezing. The Fear System operates between the PAG and the amygdala and it is aroused by external and internal stimuli, notably pain, but some responses appear to be innate caused by hard-wired sensory inputs. Panksepp mentions rats fear of open spaces, sudden movements and loud noises as example innate fear responses. But fear is connected to memory as well, and memory plays a significant role in conditioning fear responses. On memory, Panksepp explains, that learning and memory are automatic and involuntary responses (mediated by unconscious mechanisms of the brain), which in their most lasting forms are commonly tethered to emotional arousal. Emotional arousal is a necessary condition for the creation of fear-learning memories.
The Lust System. The Lust System drives basic mammalian physical impulses (sexual affects) on the one hand and social emotions on the other, which can be both positive and negative. It can drive anti-social behavior (rape, stalking) as well as building families and promoting other forms of well-being. In the male brain the center of primary sexual urges is in the medial regions of the anterior hypothalamus, (although Panksepp notes that "the precise brain location varies from one species to another). Testosterone stimulates pleasure in the male, which activates neuropeptides such as vasopressin and promotes sexual ardor, courtship, intermale aggression and possibly jealousy. Testosterone also activates nitric oxide in the brain, which promotes heightened sexual eagerness. In females, estrogen and progesterone (the estrus cycle) controls sexual arousal, but adrenal testosterone plays a role in sexual receptivity. The Lust System, Panksepp says, "recruits" the Seeking System "dopamine-fueled search for companionship.
The Care System. The Care System is not universal in the animal kingdom, but nearly all mammals and birds exhibit maternal care for their young. In fish, the job of tending to a nest of eggs is left to fathers, and the brain circuits that drive this behavior Panksepp calls the Care System. Panksepp notes that researchers learned of the existence of the Care System in mammals when they discovered that blood transfusions from postpartum female rats to virgin rats would lead to maternal behavior in the virgin rats, including nest building, hovering over young, and gathering the young who strayed from the nest. Panksepp concedes that researchers still do not which chemicals in the transferred blood interact in the brains of virgin rats to cause these behaviors, but given similarities between the urge to provide Care and the urges underlying the Seeking System, brain arousal from dopamine in conjunction with opioids, as well as oxytocin and prolactin are likely involved. Panksepp hypothesizes that the evolution of the Care System might be traced back to chemicals found in the Lust circuits of reptiles, such as vasotocin, which has a calming effect and promotes nurturant moods in some birds, and neuropeptides like mesotocin that may have evolved in vasopressin and oxytocin, which is recognized as a key maternal chemical. The maternal (and paternal) nurturing behavior must be recognized as a critical factor in the development of social brain systems. Research shows that both oxytocin and vasopressin strengthen social memories and are believed to be promote social bonds among mammals. (See July 16, 2010 post).
Research on the Care System in rats also reveals evidence of epigenetic changes leading to more prosocial behavior. Female rats lick their pups during early development and this has been shown to influence the emotional abilities of young rats later in life. Abundantly licked rats grow up to be less anxious, more resistant to stress, and more capable of exhibiting learning and other adaptive behavior later in life. These adult rats have diminished stress hormones (corticotrophin-releasing factor (CRF)) and adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH), more GABA receptor cites, which promotes reduced anxiety, and more receptors for glutamate and norepinephrine, which facilitate learning. Emotionally, these animals are less anxious, showing more activity and fearlessness, and better learning and performance in a variety of fear-inducing situations. This research could have been cited by Nessa Carey in The Epigenetic Revolution. (See April 28, 2013 post).
The Panic/Grief System. Panic and grief intuitively seem like strange bedfellows but the common emotional/behavioral link in this "system" is separation anxiety, something that is seen across a number of species. Grief connotes a sadness that arises from social loss; panic connotes a separation from a secure or stable environment. Immediately, one can conjure linkages between what Panksepp labels the Panic/Grief System and the Care System, the Fear System. The Panic System is seen in early childhood development over anxiety in separation of mother and child ("Born to Cry" is the title of this chapter), but it has also been found to be less active in adults. The Panic/Grief circuits are found in several of the same subcortical areas identified with other systems, including the PAG and surrounding subcortical regions including the dorsomedial thalamus, the ventral septial area, the dorsal preoptic area and the bed nucleus of stria terminalis. Previously identified stress neuropeptides such as CRF and ACTH, and glutamate (an excitatory neurotransmitter associated with every emotional response) arouse the Grief System. Imbalances in the Grief System are a key factor in a variety of emotional disorders because so much mental illness, Panksepp notes, is rooted in the incapacity to enjoy the security of warm interpersonal attachments. Panic attacks, depression, autism, and a variety of other social phobias are part of the Grief pathologies. The identification of neuropeptides that actually diminish separation distress and mediate the Care System, such as oxytocin and prolactin,and the stimulation of mu-opioid receptors in the brain may have role in treatments of these disorders.
The Play System. Finally, but not least, something that one might not think of as an emotional system, but Panksepp clearly documents that it is, particularly in mammals: the Play System. "Physical playfulness is a birthright of every young mammal and perhaps of many other animals as well. . . It is now certain that a genetically determined Play network that mediates positive affect exists in mammalian brains, although many details remain to be worked out." The Play System is likewise concentrated in subcortical brain regions, intimately linked to the Seeking System: the urge to play is like a type of hunger, and is not necessarily a social need, although it is linked to social emotional systems. Play is linked to the capacity to laugh, a positive emotional affect. Laughter is not merely found in humans, but also noises made by rats, chirping of birds. Laughter is stimulated early in children, including mimicry. Like the Seeking System, dopamine, which is engaged during activity that entails considerable positive anticipation and euphoria, is believed to fuel the Play System because it is aroused (correlated) during play. Play activates sensory inputs, such as touch, which go directly to older midline regions of the brain such as the parafascicular complex and the posterior dorsomedial thalamic regions.
In the foregoing, I have catalogued for each of Panksepp's seven emotional systems of the brain the suspected chemistries and at the outset I tried to demonstrate that research documents the ancient role of chemicals in the neurological systems of species and their potential link to the development of emotional system. My objective in this outline is to highlight a point in a previous post about social emotions, including moral emotions. In his book Moral Origins, Christopher Boehm concludes by saying that in a few generations we "may have identified some of the genetic mechanisms that help us to behave egoistically, nepotistically, and altruistically, along with others that make for sympathetic generosity, domination and submission, and a variety of other socially significant behaviors that are relevant to morality, including our shame responses." The earlier post (see November 21, 2012 post) observed that "Boehm may well be right that we will identify the genetic mechanisms behind moral and immoral behavior in a few generations, but the roadmap of investigation is already before us and it begins with emotions. I say this for two reasons: first, if anything, genes code for our body chemistry; genes may or may not code for specific behavior (moral or otherwise), although I doubt it (see November 30, 2009 post). But emotions are driven by electro-chemical actions and reactions in our various body systems and ultimately the neurological system leading to our brains, and genes do code for these electro-chemical actions and reactions and genes code for our brain and other body organs. If we want to understand the genetic basis for moral and immoral behavior we will look for the genes tied to these body systems and the chemistry that drives emotions." Panksepp's aggregation of the research on these primary process emotions is a good peek into the links between genes, chemistries, and anatomical structures related to emotions. In addition to linking genes with the chemicals and brain structures that drive these emotional systems, the inquiry contemplated by Boehm would presumably link these seven emotional systems to other more complex emotional systems not considered "primary process" systems, including the social emotions discussed in the November 21, 2012 post such as embarrassment, shame, guilt, contempt, indignation, sympathy, compassion, awe, gratitude, and pride.
One cannot help read The Archaeology of Mind without feeling that Panksepp believes he has been walking in the wilderness of neuroscientific research that treats emotional systems as fundamental, more fundamental than research of the neocortex. While he now believes that Antonio Damasio has joined his crusade with the publication of Self Comes to Mind (see April 8, 2011 post), in which Damasio gave a tip of the hat to Panksepp's research, Panksepp is skeptical of Damasio's earlier somatic marker hypothesis and the assertion that core consciousness (a higher order mapping process outside the subcortical regions) generates inner emotional feelings of what is happening by synthesizing information from maps abut the body and about the environment. As stated earlier, it is the subcortical emotional system that energizes the neocortex, says Panksepp, not the other way around. Fundamentally, Panksepp believes that mental and emotional disorders go hand in hand and are best understood as a chemical problem, and when understood in that leads to two important conclusions: (1) that chemistry will have a key role in providing treatment, and (2) it will cause psychotherapists to recognize that treatment must deal with the emotional aspects of the older subcortical parts of the brain. For Panksepp, the key question for all neuroscientists and biological psychiatrists is this: "How are raw affective experiences created in the brain?" The answer he believes will clarify the foundational nature of experience in general as well as affective disturbances. For example, Panksepp writes, for depression he would ask: Why does depression feel so bad? Why does depression hurt? Why is it so psychologically painful? What does it mean to experience social pain? Few neuroscientists have been willing to ask these questions.
One cannot conclude a statement about Panksepp's research without noting what he neither ignores, but nonetheless does not dwell on: the role of the cortical areas of the brain in human consciousness. When he does acknowledge higher order BrainMind structures, he says this: "Although arousals of the primary process emotional networks of mammalian brains are intensely experienced by humans and other animals, it is especially important to recognize that the secondary processes of the BrainMind, the basic forms of learning, memory, and habit formation are among the most unconscious 'mental' processes of them all. Once we understand this, then many of the bizarre and faulty views from psychology's past may be rectified. For instance, 'free will' is not a figment of our imagination as too many scientists are ready to claim these days. Free will is a higher tertiary-level neurocognitive function that we use on a regular basis (and quite effectively when we are not too emotionally aroused) for future planning actions. This is brought out beautifully in the concept of 'autonomy' and 'self-determination' as developed by Ryan and Deci (2006). However, we cannot readily will ourselves out of underlying emotional turmoil that has been created through the consolidation of maladaptive affective patterns at primary and secondary levels of BrainMind organization. At primary-process levels of emotional processing there is no free will, there is no 'controlled cognitions.' Neither do the automatic secondary processes of learning and memory functions, that are molded by our wild animal passions developmentally, exhibit free will. That can only emerge from well-sculpted, deeply reflective, cognitive attitudes." He adds, "It is surely our vast cerebral 'thinking cap' --- our extensive cortico-cognitive apparatus --- that distinguishes us mentally from our animal ancestors. That adds layers of complexity that cannot be readily addressed with animal models." Michael Gazzaniga would agree. (See September 27, 2009 post). But "language," Panksepp says," our most unique cerebral skill, "emerges through emotional guidance. Through language, however, we can uniquely study the extended tertiary-process cognitive affective consciousness of humans. And this is why there continues to be enormous growth in descriptive (ie. nonneuroscientific) emotion studies in psychology (Davidson et all., 2003)."
And with that paragraph, I pull the next book off of The Bookshelf.
Sunday, May 19, 2013
Sunday, April 28, 2013
Nessa Carey, The Epigenetics Revolution (2012)
A recurring theme running through the posts on this blog is the recognition of a unit of information as the fundamental units of physical nature. Collateral to this theme: the transmission of information and the avoidance of errors in translation during transmission, whether those communications are at the cellular level or communications among species or between individuals of a species. (See March 6, 2012, August 15, 2011, November 27, 2010, August 23, 2009, and August 17, 2009 posts). A slight change in a unit of information can potentially change the "meaning" of a larger assembly of units of information, things akin to what we might label words, a sentence, a paragraph, an entire story. Matthew Ridley uses this kind of analogy when he discusses the genome. (See November 27, 2010 post):
"Ridley calls the genome a book, the chromosome a chapter, the gene a story, an exon a paragraph, a codon a word consisting of three letters, and a base is a letter, either (in the case of DNA) an A, C, G, or T (or U in the case of RNA), for adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine, each consisting of one or two aromatic rings and arrangements of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and/or oxygen atoms. These chemical units are the basic units of information that comprise life forms, but alone they do not give rise to life. What gives rise to life is (1) the pairing of these letters along a double helix that makes up DNA, and (2) their subsequent transcription into RNA to form three letter codons, which, (3) are subsequently "translated" into a specific amino acid depending on which three of the four letters are transcribed and their sequence. (4) The particular chain of amino acids creates a protein. By this process, it is said that "genes" code for "proteins." While the RNA amino acid chains may have been the earliest form of life, "life" as we know it received a boost with the creation of cellular membranes to form the first cells that carried the proteins containing genetic information central for the cell's organization. This development is still not fully understood.
"This ability of the genes to copy themselves, read and transmit their story, under the right conditions, is the ability to create another life form. . . . [T]hese units of information [have the ability] to communicate among themselves --- an electrochemical means --- to say "Let's stick together," or "Let's avoid each other," and then to store itself as if in memory. This is what we find in the genome, whatever the species."
"Life began with RNA --- which by itself can replicate itself, and translate and transmit its meaning, as well as catalyze with --- break up or join with --- other chemicals, creating amino acids and proteins. The storage device for these words and paragraphs is DNA. An RNA gene found on chromosome 1 translates the information found in DNA to proteins, which become the primary agent for carrying out the direction specified by the information contained in the genes within a cell."
A prior post discusses how alterations in the structure of DNA and the chromosome, what we typically refer to as mutations, can lead to changes in species. (See December 14, 2010 post):
"And there are a variety of mutations of the genetic code. The most common is the equivalent of a typographical error in the process of copying the genetic code --- a substitution of one of the four letters for another. But there are also mutations involving deletions of code and insertions of repeating code or duplications. Sometimes these mutations actually mean something --- changing something about the phenotype in which the genetic code resides, but many, many times these changes mean nothing --- they don't change a thing about how the gene works. Some genes simply lose their meaning over time because they are no longer used, and these are called fossil genes. And some mutations that do have meaning simply do not survive to live another generation because selection is neither accommodating nor forgiving. When mutations occur repeatedly and have meaning --- in the sense that it changes something about the phenotype in which it resides --- and selection favors the survival of that mutation, then given enough time (many generations, thousands of years) we can find new species evolving. Carroll has reduced his mantra of chance, selection and time to this expression: "i) given sufficient time, ii) identical or equivalent mutations will arise repeatedly by chance, and iii) their fate (preservation or elimination) will be determined by the conditions of selection upon the traits they affect."
Epigenetics concerns a molecular examination of genetics, and how substitutions of molecules on a piece of DNA can have consequences for the phenotype of which the DNA is a part. This does not involve a change in the arrangement of the genetic letters, or the words, or the paragraph or the chapter, in Ridley's terms. These molecular alterations change the way in which genes are expressed. Broadly speaking, the "environment" is believed to play a role in these alterations, importantly during embryonic development, but at any stage of life. And recent research is beginning to show that epigenetic changes can be inherited for a generation or more. The change in gene expression can alter the very nature of cells themselves.
Currently, there are two fairly well known types of epigenetic modification. The first is called DNA methylation, which involves the addition of a methyl group (carbon atom bonded to 3 hydrogen atoms) to one of Ridley's genetic "letters" --- cytosine. The underlying DNA sequence is not altered by the modification. Cytosine, says Nessa Carey in The Epigenetic Revolution, has been "decorated," not changed. DNA methylation is associated with genes that are turned "off." This can lead to a number of disorders that the individual suffers from for the rest of their life. In addition to turning a gene off, it is also known to prevent messenger RNA molecules from being produced, thus stopping the DNA transcription machinery from working. The second epigenetic modification is called histone acetylation. Histone acetylation is associated with turning genes on, although that is not always the case. Again the underlying gene sequence is not altered.
Understanding epigenetic modifications allows us to better understand why "identical" twins are not identical. It leads to a better understanding of certain disorders (cancer, obesity, and other disorders). Nessa Carey describes a wide number of research projects in which science is studying whether epigenetic modifications triggers a particular disorder. I will only discuss one: early childhood abuse triggers an event that has consequences into adulthood; childhood trauma causes an alteration in gene expression in the brain that is generated or maintained by epigenetic mechanisms. The focus of this research is on a hormone known as cortisol, which is produced in response to stress. Research shows that the average level of cortisone production in adults seems to be higher for persons with traumatic childhoods. The hippocampus in the brain responds to stress, and it releases two hormones: corticotrophine-releasing hormone and arginine vasopressin. They stimulate the pituitary, which in turn releases a hormone called adrenocorticotrophin into the bloodstream. When cells of the adrenal gland take up adrenocorticotrophin, the cells release cortisol. Some of this cortisol makes its way through the bloodstream back to the brain. Receptors in the hippocampus, hypothalamus and pituitary all "recognize" cortisol and the cortisol binds to these receptors creating a signal to the brain to calm down. This reduces the production of cortisol and the result is that we are prevented from being overstressed. Adults who suffered traumatic childhoods are actually overstressed and produce too much cortisol. Something about the feedback loop that would normally reduce stress is broken. Research on mice suggests that DNA methylation of the arginine vasopressin hormone leads to increased expression of this hormone and the stimulation of a stress response. This is all very contentious at this time, and more research is underway on the impact of stress, and other brain-related topics such as memory.
Carey reports on research involving honeybees. The research is far from conclusive, but there is interest in histone modifications in the control of honeybee development and activity and DNA methylation in the changes of honeybee memory. Carey describes research showing that expression of different epigenetic enzymes varies between different social groups in colonies of ants, and the data suggests that epigenetic control of colony members may be the mechanism that has evolved in the social insects.
In The Social Conquest of Earth, biologist E.O. Wilson referred to epigenetics in an entirely different way. (September 12, 2012 post) To determine what evolved that made us humans, he begins by asking "What is human nature?" He suggests that the place to look for the answer to this question is "in the rules of development prescribed by genes, through which the universals of culture are created." Human nature, he says, is the "inherited regularities of mental development common to our species. They are epigenetic rules, which evolved by the interaction of genetic and cultural evolution that occurred over a long period in deep prehistory. These rules are the genetic biases in the way our senses perceive the world, the symbolic coding by which we represent the world, the options we automatically open to ourselves, and the responses we find easiest and most rewarding to make. . . They determine the individuals we as a rule find sexually most attractive. They lead us differentially to acquire fears and phobias concerning dangers in the environment, as from snakes and heights, to communicate with certain facial expressions and forms of body language, to bond with infants; to bond conjugally; and so on across the wide range of other categories of behavior and thought." (See September 17, 2012 post). Wilson's use of the term epigenetics is more related to the term epigenesis, and this is slightly (although not entirely) different than the study of epigenetics that forms the basis of Nessa Carey's The Epigenetics Revolution. Nor is Wilson approaching this subject from a singularly genetic angle. He is concerned with the interaction of genes and culture (broadly considered) in the evolution of a social unit. I suspect at the bottom of Wilson's use of the term are the neurochemical actions behind learning and memory that triggers epigenetic change affecting the neurological system resulting in patterns of behavior. Of interest to Wilson would be social behavior; for example, why do primates groom each other?
Epigenetics as described by Nessa Carey or in the sense intended by Edward Wilson both involve the transmission of information, alterations in the information units transferred, and the effect of these information transfers (positive, negative or neutral). This area of inquiry is a work in progress, and promises to enhance our understanding of disease and health.
"Ridley calls the genome a book, the chromosome a chapter, the gene a story, an exon a paragraph, a codon a word consisting of three letters, and a base is a letter, either (in the case of DNA) an A, C, G, or T (or U in the case of RNA), for adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine, each consisting of one or two aromatic rings and arrangements of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and/or oxygen atoms. These chemical units are the basic units of information that comprise life forms, but alone they do not give rise to life. What gives rise to life is (1) the pairing of these letters along a double helix that makes up DNA, and (2) their subsequent transcription into RNA to form three letter codons, which, (3) are subsequently "translated" into a specific amino acid depending on which three of the four letters are transcribed and their sequence. (4) The particular chain of amino acids creates a protein. By this process, it is said that "genes" code for "proteins." While the RNA amino acid chains may have been the earliest form of life, "life" as we know it received a boost with the creation of cellular membranes to form the first cells that carried the proteins containing genetic information central for the cell's organization. This development is still not fully understood.
"This ability of the genes to copy themselves, read and transmit their story, under the right conditions, is the ability to create another life form. . . . [T]hese units of information [have the ability] to communicate among themselves --- an electrochemical means --- to say "Let's stick together," or "Let's avoid each other," and then to store itself as if in memory. This is what we find in the genome, whatever the species."
"Life began with RNA --- which by itself can replicate itself, and translate and transmit its meaning, as well as catalyze with --- break up or join with --- other chemicals, creating amino acids and proteins. The storage device for these words and paragraphs is DNA. An RNA gene found on chromosome 1 translates the information found in DNA to proteins, which become the primary agent for carrying out the direction specified by the information contained in the genes within a cell."
A prior post discusses how alterations in the structure of DNA and the chromosome, what we typically refer to as mutations, can lead to changes in species. (See December 14, 2010 post):
"And there are a variety of mutations of the genetic code. The most common is the equivalent of a typographical error in the process of copying the genetic code --- a substitution of one of the four letters for another. But there are also mutations involving deletions of code and insertions of repeating code or duplications. Sometimes these mutations actually mean something --- changing something about the phenotype in which the genetic code resides, but many, many times these changes mean nothing --- they don't change a thing about how the gene works. Some genes simply lose their meaning over time because they are no longer used, and these are called fossil genes. And some mutations that do have meaning simply do not survive to live another generation because selection is neither accommodating nor forgiving. When mutations occur repeatedly and have meaning --- in the sense that it changes something about the phenotype in which it resides --- and selection favors the survival of that mutation, then given enough time (many generations, thousands of years) we can find new species evolving. Carroll has reduced his mantra of chance, selection and time to this expression: "i) given sufficient time, ii) identical or equivalent mutations will arise repeatedly by chance, and iii) their fate (preservation or elimination) will be determined by the conditions of selection upon the traits they affect."
Epigenetics concerns a molecular examination of genetics, and how substitutions of molecules on a piece of DNA can have consequences for the phenotype of which the DNA is a part. This does not involve a change in the arrangement of the genetic letters, or the words, or the paragraph or the chapter, in Ridley's terms. These molecular alterations change the way in which genes are expressed. Broadly speaking, the "environment" is believed to play a role in these alterations, importantly during embryonic development, but at any stage of life. And recent research is beginning to show that epigenetic changes can be inherited for a generation or more. The change in gene expression can alter the very nature of cells themselves.
Currently, there are two fairly well known types of epigenetic modification. The first is called DNA methylation, which involves the addition of a methyl group (carbon atom bonded to 3 hydrogen atoms) to one of Ridley's genetic "letters" --- cytosine. The underlying DNA sequence is not altered by the modification. Cytosine, says Nessa Carey in The Epigenetic Revolution, has been "decorated," not changed. DNA methylation is associated with genes that are turned "off." This can lead to a number of disorders that the individual suffers from for the rest of their life. In addition to turning a gene off, it is also known to prevent messenger RNA molecules from being produced, thus stopping the DNA transcription machinery from working. The second epigenetic modification is called histone acetylation. Histone acetylation is associated with turning genes on, although that is not always the case. Again the underlying gene sequence is not altered.
Understanding epigenetic modifications allows us to better understand why "identical" twins are not identical. It leads to a better understanding of certain disorders (cancer, obesity, and other disorders). Nessa Carey describes a wide number of research projects in which science is studying whether epigenetic modifications triggers a particular disorder. I will only discuss one: early childhood abuse triggers an event that has consequences into adulthood; childhood trauma causes an alteration in gene expression in the brain that is generated or maintained by epigenetic mechanisms. The focus of this research is on a hormone known as cortisol, which is produced in response to stress. Research shows that the average level of cortisone production in adults seems to be higher for persons with traumatic childhoods. The hippocampus in the brain responds to stress, and it releases two hormones: corticotrophine-releasing hormone and arginine vasopressin. They stimulate the pituitary, which in turn releases a hormone called adrenocorticotrophin into the bloodstream. When cells of the adrenal gland take up adrenocorticotrophin, the cells release cortisol. Some of this cortisol makes its way through the bloodstream back to the brain. Receptors in the hippocampus, hypothalamus and pituitary all "recognize" cortisol and the cortisol binds to these receptors creating a signal to the brain to calm down. This reduces the production of cortisol and the result is that we are prevented from being overstressed. Adults who suffered traumatic childhoods are actually overstressed and produce too much cortisol. Something about the feedback loop that would normally reduce stress is broken. Research on mice suggests that DNA methylation of the arginine vasopressin hormone leads to increased expression of this hormone and the stimulation of a stress response. This is all very contentious at this time, and more research is underway on the impact of stress, and other brain-related topics such as memory.
Carey reports on research involving honeybees. The research is far from conclusive, but there is interest in histone modifications in the control of honeybee development and activity and DNA methylation in the changes of honeybee memory. Carey describes research showing that expression of different epigenetic enzymes varies between different social groups in colonies of ants, and the data suggests that epigenetic control of colony members may be the mechanism that has evolved in the social insects.
In The Social Conquest of Earth, biologist E.O. Wilson referred to epigenetics in an entirely different way. (September 12, 2012 post) To determine what evolved that made us humans, he begins by asking "What is human nature?" He suggests that the place to look for the answer to this question is "in the rules of development prescribed by genes, through which the universals of culture are created." Human nature, he says, is the "inherited regularities of mental development common to our species. They are epigenetic rules, which evolved by the interaction of genetic and cultural evolution that occurred over a long period in deep prehistory. These rules are the genetic biases in the way our senses perceive the world, the symbolic coding by which we represent the world, the options we automatically open to ourselves, and the responses we find easiest and most rewarding to make. . . They determine the individuals we as a rule find sexually most attractive. They lead us differentially to acquire fears and phobias concerning dangers in the environment, as from snakes and heights, to communicate with certain facial expressions and forms of body language, to bond with infants; to bond conjugally; and so on across the wide range of other categories of behavior and thought." (See September 17, 2012 post). Wilson's use of the term epigenetics is more related to the term epigenesis, and this is slightly (although not entirely) different than the study of epigenetics that forms the basis of Nessa Carey's The Epigenetics Revolution. Nor is Wilson approaching this subject from a singularly genetic angle. He is concerned with the interaction of genes and culture (broadly considered) in the evolution of a social unit. I suspect at the bottom of Wilson's use of the term are the neurochemical actions behind learning and memory that triggers epigenetic change affecting the neurological system resulting in patterns of behavior. Of interest to Wilson would be social behavior; for example, why do primates groom each other?
Epigenetics as described by Nessa Carey or in the sense intended by Edward Wilson both involve the transmission of information, alterations in the information units transferred, and the effect of these information transfers (positive, negative or neutral). This area of inquiry is a work in progress, and promises to enhance our understanding of disease and health.
Thursday, March 28, 2013
Richard Wrangham, Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (2009)
Edward O. Wilson's research on eusociality led him to identify the nest as a common attribute among the eusocial species. Although not proven, Wilson surmises that a gene has been suppressed among the eusocial species that silences the brain's program for dispersal from the nest, leading to the sustained survival of the eusocial community. (September 12, 2012 post) Humans are included among the eusocial species, but humans disperse; they do not build and congregate in nests, but they do build and maintain social communities comprised of multiple generations and humans are organized into groups by altruistic division of labor, which are characteristics of eusocial species. As a surrogate for the nest, Wilson suggests that the campfire served a nest-like function in the development of the genus homo, which strongly suggests that mastery of fire was critical to humans eusociality.
As I read Wilson's The Social Conquest of Earth (see September 12, 2012 post), I was reminded of a book on the bookshelf that addressed this topic, Richard Wrangham's (see July 1, 2010 post) Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human. Wrangham believes that mastery of fire was critical to human evolution, but even more important, mastery of fire enabled early humans to cook their food on a regular basis. According to Wrangham, cooked food is even more significant than mastery of fire for human evolution. Armed with data and concrete examples Wrangham demonstrates that eating cooked food is linked to two evolutionary changes in the human body: (1) comparatively smaller, more efficient digestive systems (particularly the stomach and the small intestine) that require less energy to digest food and absorb nutrients than our predecessors, and (2) larger brains. Large brains require significant amounts of energy, and that energy is available to the brain only if it is not needed for other activities essential for survival such as eating and digesting. Compared to apes and chimpanzees (and presumably extinct australopithecines and habilines), humans spend a fraction of their daily life eating and digesting food. Apes and chimps spend hours eating plant food or fruit every day. The relative weight of the human gut is roughly only 60% of the relative weight of the gut of apes and chimpanzees.
The controversial question is when did the first species among the genus homo begin cooking food? For certain the benefits of and development of a preference for cooked food was accidentally discovered. Wrangham believes that human cooking begins with homo erectus. There is anthropological evidence cited by Wrangham that cutting meat with primitive stone tools began as early as 2.6 million years ago. Roughly 300,000 years later, a new species, referred to by some as homo habilis, which still had many australopithecine characteristics, emerged, and roughly another 500,000 years later the species referred to as homo erectus, emerged according the available fossil record and lived on the African continent for nearly 1.5 million years (until roughly 300,000 years ago). While it is doubtful that homo erectus had language capacity or skills (see January 31, 2013 post discussing homo neanderthalensis), what we do know is that the cranial capacity of early specimens of homo erectus was 200cc greater than homo habilis and later specimens 400-500cc greater than homo habilis, representing an increase in brain size of approximately 33-75% over the habilines. (See November 21, 2012 post). That would be the largest incremental percentage increase from species to species within the genus homo. Homo erectus is recognized to be, in many respects, to be much closer to modern homo sapiens than homo habilis. Combined with some evidence of the use of controlled fire at sites where homo erectus bones have been found, the control of fire and the significant increase in brain size (the energy for which is enabled by decreased energy used in eating and digesting food) lead Wrangham to identify homo erectus as the first human species to favor and consume cooked food on a regular basis. Wrangham also speculates that homo erectus, unlike its predecessors, favored sleeping on the ground (instead of trees) and the control of fire would have been useful in providing light to see predators at night or keeping predators away. The morphology of erectus is not as suitable for sleeping in trees as its predecessors.
Others (Aiello and Wheeler) have concluded that cooking food is the invention of homo heidelbergensis (the predecessor to homo neanderthalensis) a later species. Aiello and Wheeler believed that brain size was steady among homo erectus until the emergence of heidelbergensis with its larger brain. Wrangham finds the fossil record sufficient to support the view that brain size gradually grew among erectus and believes that the steady increase in size is attributable to improved cooking techniques, and that continued growth in brain size to heidelbergensis and ultimately to homo sapiens is likely similarly associated with improved cooking techniques, not cooking as a novel adaptation or spandrel.
Wrangham's thesis is this: "An important step in fire's becoming a central part of human lives was to maintain it at night. Suppose some habilines carried a smoldering log by day to protect against predators, then left it at the base of a sleeping tree when they climbed to make a nest at night. It would not have been such a big step to give it extra fuel so the log will still be burning the next day --perhaps after seeing this happen first by accident. From there it would have been a smaller step to sitting near the fire to keep it burning, and thereby take advantage of its protection, light, and warmth. Once they kept fire alive at night, a group of habilines in a particular place occasionally dropped food morsels by accident, at them after they had been heated, and learned that they tasted better. Repeating their habit, this group would have swiftly evolved into the first Homo erectus. The newly delicious cooked diet led to their evolving smaller guts, bigger brains, bigger bodies, and reduced body hair; more running; more hunting; longer lives; calmer temperatures; and a new emphasis on bonding between females and males. The softness of their cooked plant foods selected for smaller teeth, the protection fire provided at night enabled them to sleep on the ground and lose their climbing ability, and females likely began cooking for males, whose time was increasingly free to search for more meat and honey." So despite the relative dearth of evidence of fire dating back to the time of homo erectus, Wrangham believes that the dramatic shift in brain size and tooth size is significant evidence that Homo erectus started the first outdoor cooking kitchen.
Division of labor by sex. E.O. Wilson also includes altruistic division of labor among the attributes of eusociality (September 12, 2012 post). Wrangham has a discussion that dovetails with Wilson on this point. First, cooked food liberated males to spend more time hunting for meat in a way that chimps and apes cannot because they spend so much time chewing their food. Fire enabled men to confine their eating time to the hours around dusk and even after dark. Hunting enabled the male to contribute food to his family (including an extended family group), but this effort was ultimately dependent upon a reliable, predictable economic exchange between women and men. Women became foragers and this provided a reliable source of food energy in the event that the men of the group returned with no meat. Women also became primarily responsible for cooking.
Wrangham argues that while relying on cooked food created opportunities for cooperation, more importantly it exposed female cooks to exploitation because cooking takes time and lone cooks could not easily guard their wares from thieves. This problem was solved, Wrangham believes, by pair-bonds among males and females: a "husband" ensured that the woman's gathered foods were not taken by others and from this evolved "a simple marriage system." The male provided the female (and their children) with meat. Consistent with Boehm's observations (see November 21, 2012 post), Wrangham observes (based on anthropological evaluation of modern hunter-gatherers) that meat is actually shared among a larger group that includes not only the male's "wife" and children, but also an extended family (and possibly a stranger). The female's distribution of gathered food is largely shared just with her "husband" and their children. In the gathering of food, there may very well be cooperation among women, but the sharing of the gathered food is limited to the immediate family. Presumably sharing meat among a larger group evolved because direct reciprocity is essential to the hunting and killing of the large animal, bringing the meat back to the campfire and slaughtering it.
As I read Wilson's The Social Conquest of Earth (see September 12, 2012 post), I was reminded of a book on the bookshelf that addressed this topic, Richard Wrangham's (see July 1, 2010 post) Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human. Wrangham believes that mastery of fire was critical to human evolution, but even more important, mastery of fire enabled early humans to cook their food on a regular basis. According to Wrangham, cooked food is even more significant than mastery of fire for human evolution. Armed with data and concrete examples Wrangham demonstrates that eating cooked food is linked to two evolutionary changes in the human body: (1) comparatively smaller, more efficient digestive systems (particularly the stomach and the small intestine) that require less energy to digest food and absorb nutrients than our predecessors, and (2) larger brains. Large brains require significant amounts of energy, and that energy is available to the brain only if it is not needed for other activities essential for survival such as eating and digesting. Compared to apes and chimpanzees (and presumably extinct australopithecines and habilines), humans spend a fraction of their daily life eating and digesting food. Apes and chimps spend hours eating plant food or fruit every day. The relative weight of the human gut is roughly only 60% of the relative weight of the gut of apes and chimpanzees.
The controversial question is when did the first species among the genus homo begin cooking food? For certain the benefits of and development of a preference for cooked food was accidentally discovered. Wrangham believes that human cooking begins with homo erectus. There is anthropological evidence cited by Wrangham that cutting meat with primitive stone tools began as early as 2.6 million years ago. Roughly 300,000 years later, a new species, referred to by some as homo habilis, which still had many australopithecine characteristics, emerged, and roughly another 500,000 years later the species referred to as homo erectus, emerged according the available fossil record and lived on the African continent for nearly 1.5 million years (until roughly 300,000 years ago). While it is doubtful that homo erectus had language capacity or skills (see January 31, 2013 post discussing homo neanderthalensis), what we do know is that the cranial capacity of early specimens of homo erectus was 200cc greater than homo habilis and later specimens 400-500cc greater than homo habilis, representing an increase in brain size of approximately 33-75% over the habilines. (See November 21, 2012 post). That would be the largest incremental percentage increase from species to species within the genus homo. Homo erectus is recognized to be, in many respects, to be much closer to modern homo sapiens than homo habilis. Combined with some evidence of the use of controlled fire at sites where homo erectus bones have been found, the control of fire and the significant increase in brain size (the energy for which is enabled by decreased energy used in eating and digesting food) lead Wrangham to identify homo erectus as the first human species to favor and consume cooked food on a regular basis. Wrangham also speculates that homo erectus, unlike its predecessors, favored sleeping on the ground (instead of trees) and the control of fire would have been useful in providing light to see predators at night or keeping predators away. The morphology of erectus is not as suitable for sleeping in trees as its predecessors.
Others (Aiello and Wheeler) have concluded that cooking food is the invention of homo heidelbergensis (the predecessor to homo neanderthalensis) a later species. Aiello and Wheeler believed that brain size was steady among homo erectus until the emergence of heidelbergensis with its larger brain. Wrangham finds the fossil record sufficient to support the view that brain size gradually grew among erectus and believes that the steady increase in size is attributable to improved cooking techniques, and that continued growth in brain size to heidelbergensis and ultimately to homo sapiens is likely similarly associated with improved cooking techniques, not cooking as a novel adaptation or spandrel.
Wrangham's thesis is this: "An important step in fire's becoming a central part of human lives was to maintain it at night. Suppose some habilines carried a smoldering log by day to protect against predators, then left it at the base of a sleeping tree when they climbed to make a nest at night. It would not have been such a big step to give it extra fuel so the log will still be burning the next day --perhaps after seeing this happen first by accident. From there it would have been a smaller step to sitting near the fire to keep it burning, and thereby take advantage of its protection, light, and warmth. Once they kept fire alive at night, a group of habilines in a particular place occasionally dropped food morsels by accident, at them after they had been heated, and learned that they tasted better. Repeating their habit, this group would have swiftly evolved into the first Homo erectus. The newly delicious cooked diet led to their evolving smaller guts, bigger brains, bigger bodies, and reduced body hair; more running; more hunting; longer lives; calmer temperatures; and a new emphasis on bonding between females and males. The softness of their cooked plant foods selected for smaller teeth, the protection fire provided at night enabled them to sleep on the ground and lose their climbing ability, and females likely began cooking for males, whose time was increasingly free to search for more meat and honey." So despite the relative dearth of evidence of fire dating back to the time of homo erectus, Wrangham believes that the dramatic shift in brain size and tooth size is significant evidence that Homo erectus started the first outdoor cooking kitchen.
Division of labor by sex. E.O. Wilson also includes altruistic division of labor among the attributes of eusociality (September 12, 2012 post). Wrangham has a discussion that dovetails with Wilson on this point. First, cooked food liberated males to spend more time hunting for meat in a way that chimps and apes cannot because they spend so much time chewing their food. Fire enabled men to confine their eating time to the hours around dusk and even after dark. Hunting enabled the male to contribute food to his family (including an extended family group), but this effort was ultimately dependent upon a reliable, predictable economic exchange between women and men. Women became foragers and this provided a reliable source of food energy in the event that the men of the group returned with no meat. Women also became primarily responsible for cooking.
Wrangham argues that while relying on cooked food created opportunities for cooperation, more importantly it exposed female cooks to exploitation because cooking takes time and lone cooks could not easily guard their wares from thieves. This problem was solved, Wrangham believes, by pair-bonds among males and females: a "husband" ensured that the woman's gathered foods were not taken by others and from this evolved "a simple marriage system." The male provided the female (and their children) with meat. Consistent with Boehm's observations (see November 21, 2012 post), Wrangham observes (based on anthropological evaluation of modern hunter-gatherers) that meat is actually shared among a larger group that includes not only the male's "wife" and children, but also an extended family (and possibly a stranger). The female's distribution of gathered food is largely shared just with her "husband" and their children. In the gathering of food, there may very well be cooperation among women, but the sharing of the gathered food is limited to the immediate family. Presumably sharing meat among a larger group evolved because direct reciprocity is essential to the hunting and killing of the large animal, bringing the meat back to the campfire and slaughtering it.
Thursday, March 14, 2013
Edward Humes, Monkey Girl: Evolution, Education, Religion and the Battle for America's Soul (2008)
Deception and religion have been joined at the hip for a very long time, perhaps as long as religion has existed in human culture given that religion has its origins in believing what we can never see or know. Monkey Girl is Edward Humes' account of the Dover Township, Pennsylvania school board's effort to introduce the subject of intelligent design into the high school science curriculum and the litigation that ensued when parents stepped forward and asked a court to enjoin the school board's effort on the ground that it offended the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. What the 6-week trial in a United States District Court exposed was concerted deceit on the part of groups opposed to the teaching of natural selection and what Charles Darwin called "descent with modification" in public school curriculum because it offended the biblical stories that lead them to the belief that god (an intelligent designer) created each of the species separately and the view of some that these acts of creation began no more than 10,000 years ago. Comparable acts of deceit in the commercial world would be called mislabeling or misbranding or fraud. In court, it is called perjury.
The drive to engage in the acts of deceit documented by Humes begins with the United States Supreme Court's decision in 1987 that the teaching of creationism offended the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and could not be taught in public schools. If creationism could not be mandated as a subject of instruction in United States public schools these groups began to think about branding creationism as something else, something that sounded like it belonged in the science classroom --- intelligent design. Their legal strategy, for example, compelled them to abandon the words "god" and "creator" and relabel god an "intelligent designer." Their legal strategy also compelled them to create a controversy when, at least in the scientific community, no substantial controversy existed: the existence of an intelligent designer would be deemed a serious scientific question and one that demanded that schools "teach the controversy." The lingo of creationism and its relationship to the book of Genesis had to be purged if science students had any chance of being taught an alternate explanation of the creation of species alongside natural selection and descent with modification in the classroom. This was no easy task. To biblical literalists, it was confusing and did not sit well with the hard core biblical believers who wanted to drive natural selection and "Darwinism" from science class because, in their view, it was atheistic. But for the advocates of intelligence design, their difficulties extended beyond the religious motivations of the Dover school board. Not only were the intelligent design advocates ultimately unable to succeed in concealing the religious motivations of the school board, it turns out there was a long and unambiguous record demonstrating that intelligent design had its intellectual seed in creationism. The very book that the intelligent design advocates wanted the high school students of Dover to have in their classroom, Of Pandas and People, had been drafted prior to the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Edwards v. Aguillard, and the drafts had used the word creationism. By the time of publication, after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Edwards, the word creationism had been deleted everywhere and replaced with the term intelligent design.
At the heart of the lawsuit, known as Kitzmiller v. Town of Dover, was this question: was intelligent design science or religion? For the plaintiffs, intelligent design was on trial; for the defendants and their supporters, traditional science was on trial. After a six week trial in which the court heard from scientists on both side of the question, the court found that intelligent design was not science; it was religion.
The scheme to inject intelligent design --- as opposed to creationism --- into the science curriculum begins with a paper developed by a University of California law professor, Phillip Johnson, that came to be known as the "wedge strategy," because it envisioned hammering a "wedge" into the tree of science by criticizing evolutionary theory --- putting science on the defensive and exploiting religious sentiment that was not only skeptical of evolutionary theory, but was essentially ignorant about natural selection and the body of scientific literature that had substantiated Darwin's natural selection model. The wedge document was developed by Johnson in collaboration with the Discovery Institute, and essentially outlines not a scientific research program, but a public relations strategy to persuade people that a scientific controversy existed and that the public needed to be made aware of the controversy. The wedge document was never intended to be made public, and it was forthright and honest in expressing the goals behind the wedge strategy, leaving no doubt about its theistic underpinning:
A central part of the Discovery Institute's strategy was to change the ground rules of science so that it not only included the natural, material world, but also the supernatural ethereal world. The problem with this project is that it is nothing less than the merger of science and religion. According to the testimony of the plaintiff's expert at the Kitzmiller trial, "Science is the systematic attempt to provide natural explanations for natural phenomena." The exclusion of the supernatural from science was unavoidable. A scientific theory is testable, and is capable of being proven false. The supernatural is not testable. Judge Jones concluded, "Intelligent design is predicated on supernatural causation. . . . Creationism, intelligent design, and other claims of supernatural intervention in the origin of life or of species are not science because they are not testable by the methods of science. These claims subordinate observed data to statements based on authority, revelation, or religious belief."
Numerous posts in this blog raise issues that are relevant to the Kitzmiller case:
Teleology v teleonomy. (June 12, 2011, May 24, 2010 and March 24, 2010 post).
The human propensity for self-deception and deception. (February 4, 2012, August 28, 2011, and May 22, 2011 and May 12, 2010 post)
Anthropomorphism, anthropotheism, and anthropodenial. (March 20, 2012, June 12, 2011 and June 17, 2010 post).
Dualism and materialism. ( December 17, 2012, February 27, 2011 and September 27, 2009 post)
At its core, the intelligent design movement, as exposed in the wedge document, is about as un-American as any group can be. The long-run goal is for design theory to permeate not only religious, cultural, and moral life, but also "political life." This is so contrary to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, one would think the design movement's adherents were really living in modern Iran or some other theocracy. Yet what Monkey Girl reveals is that the intelligent design movement has so little respect for the First Amendment, because they believe the government has abandoned religion by recognizing the freedom of atheists, skeptics (agnostics), and pantheists who imagine a universe governed by natural laws (see January 31, 2013 post) and they believe the government has abandoned its moorings as a "Christian nation." In contrast, Humes closes out Monkey Girl with a quotation from the 1796 Treaty of Tripoli, signed by founding father President John Adams:
"As the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion, as it has in itself no character of enmity against the religion, or tranquility of Mussulmen; and, as the said States never entered into any war, or act of hostility, against any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the Parties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions, shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries." (Emphasis added).
Nor should one forget the Jefferson Bible, in which founding father Thomas Jefferson, excised the text pertaining to miracles and other supernatural events.
I have a proposal that will surely bring the intelligent design movement and creationists running back for the protection of the First Amendment. Congress should pass a law that requires every religious school class to teach the following every Saturday or Sunday: "The Book of Genesis is a story. It was written and later edited by men who could not explain their origins or the origins of the physical universe including other life on earth and life and other material beyond the earth. It's a wonderful story and it even has meaning, but it is just a story. Our origins really did not happen they way, Adam and Eve were not real people, and the other stories that purport to be written history of the Hebrews are merely stories as well. There may be some little historical basis in some of these stories, but they have been gilded, edited, redacted, and revised to fit a collective memory long after the events described in Genesis purportedly took place. And by the way, children, did you not see that Genesis mentions nothing about the dinosaurs and other animals that lived on earth millions of years ago, whose bones we find in the ground today. Children, do you not wonder why Genesis does not mention dinosaurs and other animals who no longer exist? The answer is simple. The men who wrote the stories in Genesis did not know about these animals. They were not as knowledgeable as you are today." Once the law is passed, I am sure there will be a lawsuit. Maybe the ACLU will be the plaintiff.
In Edwards v. Aguillard, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Antonin Scalia dissented from the majority's decision that struck down Louisiana's statute that called for the "balanced treatment" of "creation science" and "evolution science" in Louisiana schools. The 7 member majority of the Court authored by Justice Brennan and the concurring opinions of Justice Powell and Justice White found plenty of evidence that creation science lacked a secular purpose and was religiously inspired. "This is not a hard case," wrote Justice White. The case came before the Supreme Court based on the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, which meant the trial court found enough undisputed evidence presented by the plaintiff's challenging the Louisiana statute to warrant granting a judgment without a full evidentiary trial. Justice Scalia professed to take no position on the merits of "creation science," but he felt that Louisiana deserved a full evidentiary trial before an appellate court such as the US Supreme Court decided whether or not there was a valid secular purpose. One would think, and hope, that Justice Scalia, informed by the full evidentiary record in Kitzmiller, would have recognized as Justice White did in Edwards that "this is not a hard case" had the Kitzmiller case made its way to the Supreme Court for judicial review, and that he would recognize that intelligent design deserved the same fate that creation science received in Edwards.
The drive to engage in the acts of deceit documented by Humes begins with the United States Supreme Court's decision in 1987 that the teaching of creationism offended the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and could not be taught in public schools. If creationism could not be mandated as a subject of instruction in United States public schools these groups began to think about branding creationism as something else, something that sounded like it belonged in the science classroom --- intelligent design. Their legal strategy, for example, compelled them to abandon the words "god" and "creator" and relabel god an "intelligent designer." Their legal strategy also compelled them to create a controversy when, at least in the scientific community, no substantial controversy existed: the existence of an intelligent designer would be deemed a serious scientific question and one that demanded that schools "teach the controversy." The lingo of creationism and its relationship to the book of Genesis had to be purged if science students had any chance of being taught an alternate explanation of the creation of species alongside natural selection and descent with modification in the classroom. This was no easy task. To biblical literalists, it was confusing and did not sit well with the hard core biblical believers who wanted to drive natural selection and "Darwinism" from science class because, in their view, it was atheistic. But for the advocates of intelligence design, their difficulties extended beyond the religious motivations of the Dover school board. Not only were the intelligent design advocates ultimately unable to succeed in concealing the religious motivations of the school board, it turns out there was a long and unambiguous record demonstrating that intelligent design had its intellectual seed in creationism. The very book that the intelligent design advocates wanted the high school students of Dover to have in their classroom, Of Pandas and People, had been drafted prior to the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Edwards v. Aguillard, and the drafts had used the word creationism. By the time of publication, after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Edwards, the word creationism had been deleted everywhere and replaced with the term intelligent design.
At the heart of the lawsuit, known as Kitzmiller v. Town of Dover, was this question: was intelligent design science or religion? For the plaintiffs, intelligent design was on trial; for the defendants and their supporters, traditional science was on trial. After a six week trial in which the court heard from scientists on both side of the question, the court found that intelligent design was not science; it was religion.
The scheme to inject intelligent design --- as opposed to creationism --- into the science curriculum begins with a paper developed by a University of California law professor, Phillip Johnson, that came to be known as the "wedge strategy," because it envisioned hammering a "wedge" into the tree of science by criticizing evolutionary theory --- putting science on the defensive and exploiting religious sentiment that was not only skeptical of evolutionary theory, but was essentially ignorant about natural selection and the body of scientific literature that had substantiated Darwin's natural selection model. The wedge document was developed by Johnson in collaboration with the Discovery Institute, and essentially outlines not a scientific research program, but a public relations strategy to persuade people that a scientific controversy existed and that the public needed to be made aware of the controversy. The wedge document was never intended to be made public, and it was forthright and honest in expressing the goals behind the wedge strategy, leaving no doubt about its theistic underpinning:
- "to defeat scientific materialism and its destructive moral, cultural and political legacies.
- "to replace materialistic explanations with the theistic understanding that nature and human beings were created by God."
- to initially see, within five years, "intelligent design theory as an accepted alternative in the sciences and scientific research being done from the perspective of design theory" and within 20 years to see intelligent design theory as the dominant perspective in science" and to see "design theory permeate our religious, cultural, moral and political life."
- "Design theory promises to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist worldview, and to replace it with a science consonant with Christian and theistic convictions."
A central part of the Discovery Institute's strategy was to change the ground rules of science so that it not only included the natural, material world, but also the supernatural ethereal world. The problem with this project is that it is nothing less than the merger of science and religion. According to the testimony of the plaintiff's expert at the Kitzmiller trial, "Science is the systematic attempt to provide natural explanations for natural phenomena." The exclusion of the supernatural from science was unavoidable. A scientific theory is testable, and is capable of being proven false. The supernatural is not testable. Judge Jones concluded, "Intelligent design is predicated on supernatural causation. . . . Creationism, intelligent design, and other claims of supernatural intervention in the origin of life or of species are not science because they are not testable by the methods of science. These claims subordinate observed data to statements based on authority, revelation, or religious belief."
Numerous posts in this blog raise issues that are relevant to the Kitzmiller case:
Teleology v teleonomy. (June 12, 2011, May 24, 2010 and March 24, 2010 post).
The human propensity for self-deception and deception. (February 4, 2012, August 28, 2011, and May 22, 2011 and May 12, 2010 post)
Anthropomorphism, anthropotheism, and anthropodenial. (March 20, 2012, June 12, 2011 and June 17, 2010 post).
Dualism and materialism. ( December 17, 2012, February 27, 2011 and September 27, 2009 post)
At its core, the intelligent design movement, as exposed in the wedge document, is about as un-American as any group can be. The long-run goal is for design theory to permeate not only religious, cultural, and moral life, but also "political life." This is so contrary to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, one would think the design movement's adherents were really living in modern Iran or some other theocracy. Yet what Monkey Girl reveals is that the intelligent design movement has so little respect for the First Amendment, because they believe the government has abandoned religion by recognizing the freedom of atheists, skeptics (agnostics), and pantheists who imagine a universe governed by natural laws (see January 31, 2013 post) and they believe the government has abandoned its moorings as a "Christian nation." In contrast, Humes closes out Monkey Girl with a quotation from the 1796 Treaty of Tripoli, signed by founding father President John Adams:
"As the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion, as it has in itself no character of enmity against the religion, or tranquility of Mussulmen; and, as the said States never entered into any war, or act of hostility, against any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the Parties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions, shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries." (Emphasis added).
Nor should one forget the Jefferson Bible, in which founding father Thomas Jefferson, excised the text pertaining to miracles and other supernatural events.
I have a proposal that will surely bring the intelligent design movement and creationists running back for the protection of the First Amendment. Congress should pass a law that requires every religious school class to teach the following every Saturday or Sunday: "The Book of Genesis is a story. It was written and later edited by men who could not explain their origins or the origins of the physical universe including other life on earth and life and other material beyond the earth. It's a wonderful story and it even has meaning, but it is just a story. Our origins really did not happen they way, Adam and Eve were not real people, and the other stories that purport to be written history of the Hebrews are merely stories as well. There may be some little historical basis in some of these stories, but they have been gilded, edited, redacted, and revised to fit a collective memory long after the events described in Genesis purportedly took place. And by the way, children, did you not see that Genesis mentions nothing about the dinosaurs and other animals that lived on earth millions of years ago, whose bones we find in the ground today. Children, do you not wonder why Genesis does not mention dinosaurs and other animals who no longer exist? The answer is simple. The men who wrote the stories in Genesis did not know about these animals. They were not as knowledgeable as you are today." Once the law is passed, I am sure there will be a lawsuit. Maybe the ACLU will be the plaintiff.
In Edwards v. Aguillard, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Antonin Scalia dissented from the majority's decision that struck down Louisiana's statute that called for the "balanced treatment" of "creation science" and "evolution science" in Louisiana schools. The 7 member majority of the Court authored by Justice Brennan and the concurring opinions of Justice Powell and Justice White found plenty of evidence that creation science lacked a secular purpose and was religiously inspired. "This is not a hard case," wrote Justice White. The case came before the Supreme Court based on the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, which meant the trial court found enough undisputed evidence presented by the plaintiff's challenging the Louisiana statute to warrant granting a judgment without a full evidentiary trial. Justice Scalia professed to take no position on the merits of "creation science," but he felt that Louisiana deserved a full evidentiary trial before an appellate court such as the US Supreme Court decided whether or not there was a valid secular purpose. One would think, and hope, that Justice Scalia, informed by the full evidentiary record in Kitzmiller, would have recognized as Justice White did in Edwards that "this is not a hard case" had the Kitzmiller case made its way to the Supreme Court for judicial review, and that he would recognize that intelligent design deserved the same fate that creation science received in Edwards.
Tuesday, February 26, 2013
Jose Saramago, Small Memories (2009)
Memory is fragile. (See September 20, 2011 post). Jose Saramago's honest account of his memories of some events in his life when he was small in Small Memories concedes as much. "Sometimes I wonder," he writes, "if certain memories are really mine or if they're just someone else's memories of episodes in which I was merely an unwitting actor and which I found out about later when they were told to me by others who had been there, unless, of course, they, too, had only heard the story from someone else." He refers to memory's "reconstructive powers," and the capacity for memory to be refreshed: "Thanks to some documents I had assumed lost, bet which providentially turned up when I was searching for something else entirely, my disoriented memory has finally been able to fit together various disparate pieces of the puzzle and replace what was uncertain and doubtful with what was right and true."
"We often forget what we would like to remember, and yet certain images, words, flashes, illuminations repeatedly, obsessively return to us from the past at the slightst stimulus, and there's no explanation for that' we don't summon them up, they are simply there. And it is for those memories that tell me that although, at the time, I was basing myself more on intuition than, of course, on any real knowledge of these facts. . ."
This is not the first time that a post in this blog has connected Saramago's work with the subject of memory. In The Notebook (September 28, 2010 post), the Nobelist created a memory bank in blog form. In the posting on his final novel, Cain (December 20, 2011 post) I remarked, "I also believe storytelling evolved in part to preserve our memories of things past. (See August 15, 2011 post). And storytelling, whether historical or fictional or both, enables the construction of both personal and social/group identity." And Saramago is a master at clutching collective memory --- history we call it --- and creating stories --- fiction we call it --- as in The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reiss (June 28, 2011 post) and Baltasar and Blimunda (January 1, 2013 post).
A series of postings in September 2010 revolved around the subject of memory (September 9, 2010 post) but more recently a posting observed: "Personal identity is a matter of autobiographical memory. This is our autobiographical self (see April 8, 2011 post). But our autobiographical memories are shared, and this facilitates social bonding and the building of relationships. It also influences our story-telling and the stories we tell each other, whether represented as fact or fiction. Cultures are built on the sharing of autobiographical memory, yet at the same time personal identity is strongly influenced by the culture that one personally experiences. While at the outset I said that personal identity owes its existence to cultural or group identity, the reverse is true as well. Cultural identity ultimately owes its existence to the sharing of many personal identities. Autobiographical memories are merged and revised into a collective memory. But as we have seen in prior posts, memory is fluid, constantly changing and redeveloping in incremental ways. (See November 6, 2011 post)."
It is collective or shared memory that I believe is one subject that is missing from John Searle's accounting of the creation of a social world (see February 24, 2013 post). Memory, observes Searle, is important for intentionality, and therefore collective memory should be just as important for collective intentionality. That evokes the importance of culture in the creation of the human social world. That is not lost on Saramago.
"We often forget what we would like to remember, and yet certain images, words, flashes, illuminations repeatedly, obsessively return to us from the past at the slightst stimulus, and there's no explanation for that' we don't summon them up, they are simply there. And it is for those memories that tell me that although, at the time, I was basing myself more on intuition than, of course, on any real knowledge of these facts. . ."
This is not the first time that a post in this blog has connected Saramago's work with the subject of memory. In The Notebook (September 28, 2010 post), the Nobelist created a memory bank in blog form. In the posting on his final novel, Cain (December 20, 2011 post) I remarked, "I also believe storytelling evolved in part to preserve our memories of things past. (See August 15, 2011 post). And storytelling, whether historical or fictional or both, enables the construction of both personal and social/group identity." And Saramago is a master at clutching collective memory --- history we call it --- and creating stories --- fiction we call it --- as in The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reiss (June 28, 2011 post) and Baltasar and Blimunda (January 1, 2013 post).
A series of postings in September 2010 revolved around the subject of memory (September 9, 2010 post) but more recently a posting observed: "Personal identity is a matter of autobiographical memory. This is our autobiographical self (see April 8, 2011 post). But our autobiographical memories are shared, and this facilitates social bonding and the building of relationships. It also influences our story-telling and the stories we tell each other, whether represented as fact or fiction. Cultures are built on the sharing of autobiographical memory, yet at the same time personal identity is strongly influenced by the culture that one personally experiences. While at the outset I said that personal identity owes its existence to cultural or group identity, the reverse is true as well. Cultural identity ultimately owes its existence to the sharing of many personal identities. Autobiographical memories are merged and revised into a collective memory. But as we have seen in prior posts, memory is fluid, constantly changing and redeveloping in incremental ways. (See November 6, 2011 post)."
It is collective or shared memory that I believe is one subject that is missing from John Searle's accounting of the creation of a social world (see February 24, 2013 post). Memory, observes Searle, is important for intentionality, and therefore collective memory should be just as important for collective intentionality. That evokes the importance of culture in the creation of the human social world. That is not lost on Saramago.
Sunday, February 24, 2013
John Searle, Making The Social World (2010)
The substance of John Searle's most recent book, Making the Social World, is largely covered by the last chapter of his 2008 selection of essays, Philosophy in a New Century entitled "Social Ontology: Some Basic Principles" (see January 21, 2011 post). I refer the reader back to this earlier post for Searle's discussion of status functions, deontic powers, and desire-independent reasons for action. This is a discussion of the language-enabled creation of obligations, permissions, rights, responsibilities, duties, obligations and the like (what Searle calls deontic powers) that Searle tells us are the glue of the human social world and collective action. I wish to cover two topics in this posting: first, the importance of language in making a social world, and second, the significance of human imagination in Searle's model of the social world.
Language is the foundation of all social institutions, says Searle. "We will not understand an essential feature of language if we do not see that it necessarily involves social commitments, and that the necessity of these social commitments derives from the social character of the communication situation, the conventional character of the devices, used, and the intentionality of speaker meaning. It is this feature that enables language to form the foundation of human society in general." Language, adds Searle, introduces deontology into social relations and how it creates an institutional reality with a deontic power. The foundation of Searle's thesis is this: "If a speaker intentionally conveys information to a hearer using socially accepted conventions for the purpose of producing belief in the hearer about a state of affairs in the world, then the speaker is committed to the truth of his utterance." There is no way, Searle comments, that if I say to someone publicly, intentionally, explicitly, "There is an animal coming toward us," without being committed to the truth of the propositional content that there is an animal coming toward us. Both the belief and the statement involve commitments, but the commitment of the statement is much stronger, for if the commitment of the privately held belief turns out to be false, I am free to revise it. In the case of the statement, however, I am committed to not only to revision in the case of falsehood, but I am also committed to providing reasons for the original statement, I am committed to sincerity in making it, and I am publicly responsible if it turns out to be false. A speech act is more than just an expression of belief; a speech act is a public performance.
To appreciate the significance that Searle attaches to language in humans, it is important to understand what Searle believes language added to our prelinguistic capabilities and therefore ask: what are the features that prelinguistic human mentality and language have in common (and therefore what did language contribute over and above our prelinguistic mentality)? The common features, according to Searle, are these:
While denying that he is engaging in speculative evolutionary biology, Searle asks us to imagine hominids with the full range of prelinguistic capabilities just noted, but not having language. Evolutionary biology has, in fact, established that this scenario likely existed more than 50,000 to 100,000 years ago. (See January 31, 2013 post) depending on when we determine that language emerged in humans. What we are capable of achieving with language, says Searle, that we cannot achieve with our prelinguistic consciousness is the ability to manipulate the syntactical elements. Language consists of sentences composed of syntactical elements that can be manipulated; prelinguistic intentional states are not: "the dog might think that someone is approaching the door but the dog cannot think the false thought that door is approaching someone." [This may or may not be true for a dog, but I am skeptical that it is necessarily true for the prelinguistic human --- to be discussed below when I touch on imagination.] Importantly, speech acts come in five categories: (i) assertives (representing how things are); (ii) directives (orders, commands); (iii) commissives (promises, pledges); (iv) expressives (apologies, thanks); and (v) declarations. The first four speech acts have their analogs in intentional states (corresponding to beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions such as fear, hope and the like) and are not causally self-referential. Declarations are different. In the case of a declaration, "we make something the fact by declaring it to be the case." Declarations, on the other hand, have no prelinguistic analog and they are causally self-referential: the prelinguistic intentional states "cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires language." This has enormous significance for the construction of a social reality (derived from perception, intentional action, and/or memory). But through a declaration we have the ability to declare things to be the case that were not necessarily the case prior to the declaration: that I am the shaman of this tribe, I am the leader of this tribe, these five persons comprise our governing council, this piece of paper shall be legal tender for all debts and obligations public or private. Equally, if not more important for Searle, language creates speaker meaning for those prelinguistic intentional states, and, as noted in the opening paragraph of this post, with respect to those causally self-referential intentional states, language necessarily involves social commitments by declaring what we perceive, intend, or recall to the be the case. And so once we have language, we have a deontology --- the ability to establish duties, obligations, rights and the like that are desire-independent. With collective acceptance of these duties, obligations, rights and the like, we can have collective intentionality.
Not everyone concurs with Professor Searle's view on the importance of language. Frank Hindriks, for example, surmises that collective acceptance and collective intentionality can arise through gesture (including sanctions):
As a matter of anthropology and evolutionary biology, Hindriks may be closer to the mark as Chris Boehm's Moral Origins indicates. (See November 21, 2012 post). Searle admits that cooperation among hominids is a characteristic of pre-linguistic humans. But Boehm's thesis is that forms of human organization (egalitarian in nature) emerged as early as 150,000 to 200,000 years ago (if not earlier in other homo species), primarily through sanctioning behavior (subtle or lethal), well before language emerged 50,000 to 100,000 years ago. It may very well be true that the kind of social institutions created by humans for the first time 10,000-35,000 years ago could not have occurred without language, but if Hindriks is correct, as some evidence suggests, then it means that humans were capable of non-linguistic declarations and that "hearer meaning" and collective acceptance in the pre-linguistic world was secured through a punch in the face. And perhaps by virtue of mirror neurons. (See October 25, 2011 and September 18, 2009 posts).
This brings me to the more disappointing accounting in Searle's account of the creation of a social reality, although admittedly he does not ignore the subject. Professor Searle is certainly correct when he says that what typically gets communicated in speech acts are intentional states representing the world. A previous post noted the research that truth telling is the default position of the human brain (see February 4, 2012 post) and this seems to make common sense as well. But the human capacity to engage in both deception and self-deception cannot be overlooked. (See February 4, 2012 and June 12, 2011 and May 22, 2011 posts). This is missing from Searle's analysis, although he expressly acknowledges that the "one faculty that is left out of [his listing of intentional states], because it does not have a direction of fit, is imagination. . . unlike belief, which has the downward direction of fit, or desire, which has the upward direction of fit, my imagining something commits me neither to believing that what I imagine is the case, nor to the wanting it to be the case. Sometimes one fantasizes what one would like to occur, but it is not an essential feature of fantasy or imagination that they are forms of desire. One can fantasize what one fears or hates, as well as what one believes might happen, and indeed what one believes could not possibly happen. There is no responsibility for fitting with imagination. Another feature peculiar to imaging is that it is, or can be, free voluntary action. . . Imagination will have a role in our account of social ontology, because the creation of a reality that exists only because we think it exists requires a certain level of imagination." The mistake here, it seems to me, is a virtual assumption that the truth-telling default position of the human brain is the only position. We know that is not the case. We lie and deceive more frequently than we care to admit, and, importantly for this discussion, we do occasionally engage in acts of deception and make our imagination fit the world by declaring it to be the case even though that is inconsistent with the objective facts. The Catholic Church's denial of the Copernican System is an obvious example. (See December 17, 2012 and December 5, 2012 post).
This is why, in discussing Searle's example of the dog who "cannot think the false thought that door is approaching someone" I questioned whether this was necessarily true for prelinguistic humans. If a prelinguistic human believed that the earth circles the sun, it is equally possible that the prelinguistic human could have held the false thought that the sun circles the earth. There is no apparent reason why prelinguistic human mental states are not capable of manipulation on account of imagination. Human social reality can be constructed on the basis of false beliefs and by declaring that to be the case, and Searle admits that this can be the case as when "a community believes that someone has divine powers," where the belief goes beyond the fact. He admits that "a whole system of status functions may be based on false beliefs," but he says that from the perspective of institutional analysis, it does not matter whether the beliefs are true or false; it only matters whether the people do in fact collectively recognize or accept the system of status functions. OK. So we create a "social" reality that is not made of the same the brute physical facts made of "mindless, meaningless, physical particles." I can accept that, but it seems to contradict the purpose of this book which is "not to allow ourselves to postulate two worlds or three worlds or anything of the sort. Our task is to give an account of how we live in exactly one world, and how all these different phenomena, from quarks and gravitational attraction to cocktail parties and governments are part of that one world."
Language is the foundation of all social institutions, says Searle. "We will not understand an essential feature of language if we do not see that it necessarily involves social commitments, and that the necessity of these social commitments derives from the social character of the communication situation, the conventional character of the devices, used, and the intentionality of speaker meaning. It is this feature that enables language to form the foundation of human society in general." Language, adds Searle, introduces deontology into social relations and how it creates an institutional reality with a deontic power. The foundation of Searle's thesis is this: "If a speaker intentionally conveys information to a hearer using socially accepted conventions for the purpose of producing belief in the hearer about a state of affairs in the world, then the speaker is committed to the truth of his utterance." There is no way, Searle comments, that if I say to someone publicly, intentionally, explicitly, "There is an animal coming toward us," without being committed to the truth of the propositional content that there is an animal coming toward us. Both the belief and the statement involve commitments, but the commitment of the statement is much stronger, for if the commitment of the privately held belief turns out to be false, I am free to revise it. In the case of the statement, however, I am committed to not only to revision in the case of falsehood, but I am also committed to providing reasons for the original statement, I am committed to sincerity in making it, and I am publicly responsible if it turns out to be false. A speech act is more than just an expression of belief; a speech act is a public performance.
To appreciate the significance that Searle attaches to language in humans, it is important to understand what Searle believes language added to our prelinguistic capabilities and therefore ask: what are the features that prelinguistic human mentality and language have in common (and therefore what did language contribute over and above our prelinguistic mentality)? The common features, according to Searle, are these:
- Perception. These are our sensory capabilities. Perception and the object perceived are causally self-referential, says Searle: we experience an object only if the presence of the object caused our sensory experience of the object.
- Beliefs, desires, intending, and emotions such as hopes, fears and the like. These are the capabilities of the mind by which it is directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. This is referred to as intentionality (a concept not limited to "intending"). Beliefs, etc. are not causally self-referential.
- Intentional action. This capacity is embraces a causal sequence (intention and action are causally self-referential), assuming that action actually occurs. There can be a prior intent to act; it can be an intention that is coincident to acting. All actions require intentions-in-acting, but not all actions require prior intent.
- (At least) short-term memory. Like intentional action, memory is causally self-referential: we recall something only if we experienced the thing that triggers our present memory of that thing.
While denying that he is engaging in speculative evolutionary biology, Searle asks us to imagine hominids with the full range of prelinguistic capabilities just noted, but not having language. Evolutionary biology has, in fact, established that this scenario likely existed more than 50,000 to 100,000 years ago. (See January 31, 2013 post) depending on when we determine that language emerged in humans. What we are capable of achieving with language, says Searle, that we cannot achieve with our prelinguistic consciousness is the ability to manipulate the syntactical elements. Language consists of sentences composed of syntactical elements that can be manipulated; prelinguistic intentional states are not: "the dog might think that someone is approaching the door but the dog cannot think the false thought that door is approaching someone." [This may or may not be true for a dog, but I am skeptical that it is necessarily true for the prelinguistic human --- to be discussed below when I touch on imagination.] Importantly, speech acts come in five categories: (i) assertives (representing how things are); (ii) directives (orders, commands); (iii) commissives (promises, pledges); (iv) expressives (apologies, thanks); and (v) declarations. The first four speech acts have their analogs in intentional states (corresponding to beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions such as fear, hope and the like) and are not causally self-referential. Declarations are different. In the case of a declaration, "we make something the fact by declaring it to be the case." Declarations, on the other hand, have no prelinguistic analog and they are causally self-referential: the prelinguistic intentional states "cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires language." This has enormous significance for the construction of a social reality (derived from perception, intentional action, and/or memory). But through a declaration we have the ability to declare things to be the case that were not necessarily the case prior to the declaration: that I am the shaman of this tribe, I am the leader of this tribe, these five persons comprise our governing council, this piece of paper shall be legal tender for all debts and obligations public or private. Equally, if not more important for Searle, language creates speaker meaning for those prelinguistic intentional states, and, as noted in the opening paragraph of this post, with respect to those causally self-referential intentional states, language necessarily involves social commitments by declaring what we perceive, intend, or recall to the be the case. And so once we have language, we have a deontology --- the ability to establish duties, obligations, rights and the like that are desire-independent. With collective acceptance of these duties, obligations, rights and the like, we can have collective intentionality.
Not everyone concurs with Professor Searle's view on the importance of language. Frank Hindriks, for example, surmises that collective acceptance and collective intentionality can arise through gesture (including sanctions):
"Consider Searle’s example of a wall that decays and turns from a physical structure into an institutional boundary (94--‐96). It is not obvious that any linguistic communication is required in the process. People can observe each other’s behavior including sanctioning behavior such as frowning when someone crosses the boundary. At some point it is true that the stones that are left form a boundary, and this fact involves the obligation not to cross it. The stones form a boundary because the relevant people recognize it as such. These people believe that it is a boundary, and recognize the deontic powers that come with being a boundary. In light of this, it seems fair to say that the collective intentional states that are involved in the constitution of the boundary have the double direction of fit. Language needs not enter, neither to account for the double direction of fit [causal self-reference] nor to explain the normative nature of this institutional fact. I am not sure what Searle has in mind when he mentions conventionally encoded commitments, but see no reason to believe that I have left anything out of the picture that essentially involves linguistic conventions. So it seems that Searle overestimates the role language plays in institutions when he claims language is constitutive of institutions."
As a matter of anthropology and evolutionary biology, Hindriks may be closer to the mark as Chris Boehm's Moral Origins indicates. (See November 21, 2012 post). Searle admits that cooperation among hominids is a characteristic of pre-linguistic humans. But Boehm's thesis is that forms of human organization (egalitarian in nature) emerged as early as 150,000 to 200,000 years ago (if not earlier in other homo species), primarily through sanctioning behavior (subtle or lethal), well before language emerged 50,000 to 100,000 years ago. It may very well be true that the kind of social institutions created by humans for the first time 10,000-35,000 years ago could not have occurred without language, but if Hindriks is correct, as some evidence suggests, then it means that humans were capable of non-linguistic declarations and that "hearer meaning" and collective acceptance in the pre-linguistic world was secured through a punch in the face. And perhaps by virtue of mirror neurons. (See October 25, 2011 and September 18, 2009 posts).
This brings me to the more disappointing accounting in Searle's account of the creation of a social reality, although admittedly he does not ignore the subject. Professor Searle is certainly correct when he says that what typically gets communicated in speech acts are intentional states representing the world. A previous post noted the research that truth telling is the default position of the human brain (see February 4, 2012 post) and this seems to make common sense as well. But the human capacity to engage in both deception and self-deception cannot be overlooked. (See February 4, 2012 and June 12, 2011 and May 22, 2011 posts). This is missing from Searle's analysis, although he expressly acknowledges that the "one faculty that is left out of [his listing of intentional states], because it does not have a direction of fit, is imagination. . . unlike belief, which has the downward direction of fit, or desire, which has the upward direction of fit, my imagining something commits me neither to believing that what I imagine is the case, nor to the wanting it to be the case. Sometimes one fantasizes what one would like to occur, but it is not an essential feature of fantasy or imagination that they are forms of desire. One can fantasize what one fears or hates, as well as what one believes might happen, and indeed what one believes could not possibly happen. There is no responsibility for fitting with imagination. Another feature peculiar to imaging is that it is, or can be, free voluntary action. . . Imagination will have a role in our account of social ontology, because the creation of a reality that exists only because we think it exists requires a certain level of imagination." The mistake here, it seems to me, is a virtual assumption that the truth-telling default position of the human brain is the only position. We know that is not the case. We lie and deceive more frequently than we care to admit, and, importantly for this discussion, we do occasionally engage in acts of deception and make our imagination fit the world by declaring it to be the case even though that is inconsistent with the objective facts. The Catholic Church's denial of the Copernican System is an obvious example. (See December 17, 2012 and December 5, 2012 post).
This is why, in discussing Searle's example of the dog who "cannot think the false thought that door is approaching someone" I questioned whether this was necessarily true for prelinguistic humans. If a prelinguistic human believed that the earth circles the sun, it is equally possible that the prelinguistic human could have held the false thought that the sun circles the earth. There is no apparent reason why prelinguistic human mental states are not capable of manipulation on account of imagination. Human social reality can be constructed on the basis of false beliefs and by declaring that to be the case, and Searle admits that this can be the case as when "a community believes that someone has divine powers," where the belief goes beyond the fact. He admits that "a whole system of status functions may be based on false beliefs," but he says that from the perspective of institutional analysis, it does not matter whether the beliefs are true or false; it only matters whether the people do in fact collectively recognize or accept the system of status functions. OK. So we create a "social" reality that is not made of the same the brute physical facts made of "mindless, meaningless, physical particles." I can accept that, but it seems to contradict the purpose of this book which is "not to allow ourselves to postulate two worlds or three worlds or anything of the sort. Our task is to give an account of how we live in exactly one world, and how all these different phenomena, from quarks and gravitational attraction to cocktail parties and governments are part of that one world."
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